

The Month in Review

AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR Hungary was in the throes of its Revolt and Poland was feverishly groping towards new freedoms. All of Soviet-dominated Europe was astir as restive millions threatened to pit their strength against the regimes. Soviet tanks rumbled through country lanes and city thoroughfares; after days of hope and uncertainty, the Hungarian uprising was savagely stilled, the Polish rebellion contained. Communist power everywhere was maintained or re-imposed—but at a tremendous cost. Now, a year later, many of the wounds then opened still bleed, many of the hopes then raised survive. The deep wells of discontent are constantly replenished, despite the far-flung economic concessions and political repression that followed the upheavals throughout the Satellite area.



In all the countries of the orbit Communist intellectuals are still fighting, openly or covertly, the orthodoxy imposed by the ruling cliques. In Poland, where these "liberals" have long been in the vanguard of the struggle, their most recent clash with Gomulka and his "centrist" Party faction has precipitated a real crisis in Communist ranks. The most dramatic symptom of this conflict was Gomulka's decision to silence for ever the "liberal" Communist student paper *Poprostu*, a decision which led to five days of street rioting by youngsters in the capital and sympathetic demonstrations in other Polish cities. But there have also been other, less publicized thrusts at the intellectuals, many of whom are now under fire from Moscow for alleged "revisionism." It seems that Gomulka is now bent on drastically curbing the influence of that wing of the Party which paved the way for his return to power. At the same time he has lately ordered a stepped up campaign against "rightist deviation" in the ever more popular puppet Peasant Party. Thus shorn of the support of many of his "October Days" adherents, Gomulka now steers a divided Party in its shaky rule over an increasingly disenchanted people.

In Hungary, many of the writers who were so active immediately before and during the Revolt and so tellingly silent in the twelve months since then have now been made to put pen to paper once again. Deprived of a livelihood, pressured by the regime day in day out and aware, no doubt, that the fate of their imprisoned comrades hinged on their behavior, these intellectuals are outwardly cooperating. But even now some courageously refuse to recant, and their very letter of allegiance was at once the object of the regime's ire for the coldness of its proffered embrace. Similarly, the university students, now officially quiet and conforming, are still felt to be a real danger to the authorities. Minister of State Marosan in fact recently saw fit to rave at them at length, threatening immediate reprisals for any misconduct on the anniversary of the Revolt.

In the other countries of the orbit, too, there was nervousness marked by continued witch-hunts for erring writers. And in Czechoslovakia the basic instability was reflected in a large-scale revamping of the Five Year Plan. Thus, although all the regimes made the most of the disorders at Little Rock and the Soviet launching of the first earth satellite, all of them were still very much engrossed in coping with the problems of the new era born in the tumultuous days a year ago.

Composed at the Height of the Revolt:

"Funeral Oration at the Grave of the Fallen Heroes"

"Conceived in the manner of Thucydides"

by Milan Fust

This deeply moving eulogy to the dead of the Hungarian Revolt appeared in Irodalmi Ujsag, a publication of the Hungarian Writers' Union, on November 2, two days before the final Soviet attack. Milan Fust is one of the most noted of the older generation of Hungarian writers; he is now in his seventies. The eulogy's stress on the democratic nature of the aims of the Revolt, and its castigation of the aristocracy are particularly interesting in light of the year-long attempt by Kadar's regime and Soviet propagandists to paint the Revolt as a reactionary counterrevolution led by the dispossessed aristocracy. Fust has so far published nothing under the Kadar dictatorship.

MY FRIENDS, GOOD COMPANIONS in so much suffering and in hopes bright and new, listen to me. These heroes who now here lie in deep silence, their mouths stopped by the resoluteness of their souls, are the same heroes that the world now justly mourns and praises. It praises above all their unparalleled, unimaginable courage with which they have set an example for the whole earth, demonstrating how freedom and country must be loved by the faithful sons of such a small nation. But they have also set an example of perseverance and zealous energy testifying that the fire of freedom in their hearts was not simply a passing enthusiasm. They did not run from the thunder of tanks and guns but stood firm, their tender young lives before the cold steel, and fought until their last breath. In all the praise and in all the mourning, I too take my broken-hearted share. Like you, I too lean above them to shower with my tears their pale, young faces and their—oh how sad it is to say!—hearts, stopped forever. But this is not all I have now to tell you. I am a tired old man who has seen much during my many years of life. But I have seen nothing like this. And my wonder at these

deeds I would like to communicate to you, my friends.

To begin with, I would like to talk about the unique self-imposed discipline of the people, which was manifested in this Revolt. This discipline was shown, for example, by the fact that there was no looting of shops and homes. This single circumstance would, in itself, be enough to warrant our unrestrained admiration. But it was not only this fact which caused the wonder which has shaken me to the very bottom of my heart, the memory of which I would like to take to my grave. From these my wonder came: the political prudence, the wisdom and moderation, as well as the kindness and the heartfelt good will the revolutionaries showed toward their fellow human beings. And it was that wonder which renewed all my love for my fellow countrymen.

For these boys, and the people, were not crying for the old landlords, nor the estates; neither were they anxious for riches or for the return of the dukes of a disliked aristocracy. In this respectable, honest, disciplined and thus glorious revolution, not a single selfish act or Fascist word was observed. This is what made me proud and this is what I never want to forget. Frankly, this Revolt was very modest in its material aspirations, lamentably modest but nevertheless sublime, for in the plane of material demands it strove only for the basic necessities of life and, above this, for the most important values of the soul. And what, I ask, are these? They are true democracy and real freedom.

In addition to noting these higher values, I feel I should speak openly and explain that this revolution has not endangered our goal of equal economic opportunity for all. Its discipline was like that of the really well-intentioned, well-educated workers. It was conscious, clever and determined. It demanded the return of a decent life and human

(Continued on page 6)

The afternoon of October 23, 1956, the first day of the Hungarian Revolt. In Budapest, a mass meeting of students has gathered at the statue of the great Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi, to listen to Petofi's poem "Rise, Hungarians!" and to voice their demands for freedom.

Keystone





Keystone

A squadron of Soviet tanks moving through the streets of the capital.



Highlight

The Corvin Theater, one of the centers of Hungarian resistance in Budapest.

Fight for Freedom:



Keystone

Radio Budapest, which students attempted to take over as the Revolt began.



Highlight

Armor and rubble: a Budapest street scene during the Revolt.



Keystone

The head of the giant Budapest statue of Joseph Stalin, torn down by revolutionaries.



Keystone

Hungarian refugees arriving in Austria.

Hungary, One Year Ago



Keystone

Wrecked Soviet vehicles at a corner of the Kilian Barracks, a rebel stronghold.

Keystone

Soviet tanks, ostensibly on the way out of Budapest two days before the November 4 onslaught, at one end of the Marguerite Bridge.

(Continued from page 2)

dignity for the people. And always it kept an attitude characterized by dignity, modesty and moderation. It has suppressed any kind of excess and has given no extremes free rein. And this, my friends, is what should cause you and me to shed tears together if you have given serious thought to what I have said.

Now I notice that all of this is not sufficient to describe the true state of my mind in connection with the great events of the revolution. Above all, I have to confess here that previously I had little faith in the vitality of the nation. We are a broken, a tired, and excessively tormented people—these were my thoughts. And this belief of mine was not a new one.

About thirty years ago I was talking one afternoon with a German gentleman of very high rank. He was not an unusually gifted person but his historical knowledge was impressive. Here is what this gentleman said to me at that time:

"The character of every people which has lived for long in slavery deteriorates. Look at the Polish and Hungarian aristocracy. Have not the great majority of them for centuries been traitors to their own country? Were they not busy with intrigue around the Viennese and other courts, zealously occupying themselves there? Is it not true that they had dropped their mother tongue, that they were selling their own country and every aspiration toward freedom of their poor nation? And did they not do this for the advantages granted to their own class, for estates and for titles? And how ornate were their costumes and how boastful their manners! A Hungarian baron would put on more airs than our own dukes. And are there more backward, stubborn and more haughty slave-owners than the Polish nobility?"

These were his words and I felt compelled to believe that he was right and until these days just past I repeated to myself: indeed the character of my poor people has really been broken, once and for all, during the past centuries of humiliation. Oh, they would now reconcile themselves to anything, surrender to anything. No people on earth would submit to more humiliation than my poor, tormented people. And how often have I shed the tears of my old age about this. The Tartars, the Turks, the Germans, and then again the Germans, have, in turn, oppressed us . . . How could this small, orphaned people even survive in the blessed and cursed middle area of the Danube and Tisza rivers, a region that seems to be an enticing and promising area of interest to all neighboring countries? How could they save their national existence except by begging, humbling and resigning themselves to anything, always overdoing anything the oppressing powers demanded of them?

These thoughts I have nurtured up to now, but I have raised my head from my humiliation and I speak differently in view of recent events. Because the Poles too, oh the Poles! . . . I would not have dreamed it of them. They too have produced such flaming demonstrations of their

Wreaths for the Fallen



Highlight

In Budapest, during the Revolt, families of those killed in the fighting lay wreaths on the graves.

love of freedom that the human heart was struck with awe and the soul was enraptured beyond its human shell . . . If this be so, then what words to describe our revolution?

These beloved dead sacrificed their lives for the greatest treasures a man could possess: country and liberty. And we, the survivors, we also would like to sacrifice our lives to attain their goals. As for me, I would gladly give my old life for their cause and I perceive through your tears that you, the younger generation, do not want to remain behind.

And now let us examine how this wonder really happened. How could two nations, suffering for long centuries, have suddenly attained strength as mighty as erupting volcanoes, as brilliant as the radiance of comets? The only explanation I can give is that this blessed youth, the body of university students, was composed—both in Poland and in Hungary—not of the spoiled sons of the aristocracy, not of the younger crop of the lesser gentry, ever ready for haughtiness and hatred, but of the children of the people, well acquainted with the hardships of life. It is the sons of peasants, of workers and of the bourgeoisie who, in cooperation with the workers and the people's army, have made this most glorious revolution, this revolution of purity, of honor, of humane principles and of kindness.

Now, I do beg that the story told by this Revolt remain graven in your memory and kept alive in your soul. And after you have watered these graves with your tears and covered them with the foliage of autumn—and so satisfied the demands of the mourning heart—let you now depart with hearts quiet and calm.

And we shall see what the future holds in store for us.

The Smallholders' Party in the Revolt

The Rebirth of a Democratic Party

By Istvan B. Racz

This is another in the series of articles on various aspects of the Hungarian Revolt by men who were eyewitnesses of that tragic drama. The present article views the Revolt from the point of view of one of the leading young members of the Smallholders' Party which, before it was torn apart by Communist tyranny, had commanded the allegiance of a large proportion of the Hungarian people. The author played a prominent part in the tumultuous events surrounding the re-establishment of his party during the Revolt, in the few days of freedom before the return of Soviet tanks blotted out hope of real democracy. He includes in his account "camera's eye" views of significant moments; these are printed in italics.

About The Author

BORN IN SEPTEMBER 1923 in Turkeve (village in eastern Hungary), son of a small farmer.

Enrolled in University of Economics in Budapest, 1942. Led in organizing Freedom Front of Hungarian Youth (to fight the Germans) in 1944. Arrested by Gestapo same year.

Escaped from Nazi prison in 1945 and became Chairman of Independent Youth organization (then the largest Hungarian youth movement).

Youngest Member of Parliament (Smallholders' Party), 1945.

Chairman of National Council of Hungarian Youth, 1945-47. In same period wrote on political and economic subjects in various Budapest newspapers and magazines.

Again enrolled in University of Economics, 1947, but left when the Communist regime, as he states, "turned it into a University of Marxist-Leninist ideology."

Under strict police surveillance, 1948-50.

Arrested by security police in 1950, sent to Kistarcsa prison camp, then to notorious forced labor "death camp" at Reck.

Freed in 1953, but permitted employment only as a manual laborer.

During Revolt was member of Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals, member of Board of Petofi Circle, elected to Executive Committee of Smallholders' Party. Assigned task of heading Smallholders' rural reorganization drive.

Left Hungary early in 1957. Now in the United States.

The Author



Istvan B. Racz

ON OCTOBER 30, 1956, the government of Imre Nagy repudiated the one-party political system. "We will base our administration," the Premier announced over Radio Budapest that day, "on the principles of democratic co-operation as expressed by the coalition parties in 1945." After Nagy, the new Minister of State, member of the Smallholders' Party Zoltan Tildy—former Premier, former President, former political prisoner of the Communists—stepped to the microphone. "We must prepare for free elections," he said, "... for secret elections."

This was, it then seemed, the end of more than a decade of oppression for the Smallholders' Party. Its leaders had been exiled, imprisoned and killed. Throughout the countryside their followers—who had cast 57 percent of the nation's total vote in the free election of 1945—had been reduced to the condition of enforced silence and exploitation which, for so much of its history, has been the lot of the Hungarian peasantry.

The Smallholders' Party which emerged during the Revolt was a rejuvenated organization, far different in its aims from the prewar party. During the Horthy Regency, the Smallholders had appeared to work mainly for the interests of the middle peasantry, rather than for the poorest farmer and the landless agricultural worker. But the leaders and members of the party, together with the whole nation, had learned from their years under the Communist regime. The new organization was adapted to the requirements of the times; its work was geared to the demands of the future. It had turned to the youth, especially the young intelligentsia who had come into the party in 1945, the members of MEFESZ and other liberal youth groups,

who by now constituted the large majority of the organization.*

The Traitors

THE NEW INFLUENCE OF YOUTH in our party did not result only from the destruction of our older leadership by Communist courts and security police. It came about also because of the example set by that minority of the older members who proved traitorous not only to their party, but to their country as well. Chief among these was Istvan Dobi.** He and his associates were the official representatives of the Smallholders between 1948 and 1956; as such, they held high administrative posts in the regime. Publicly, in the press and over the radio, they approved the illegal actions of the Communist hierarchy. They were among the most ardent followers of Rakosi and his clique. During the Revolt, most remained silently within the Communist ranks. Some of their number had left the regime in the years before October 1956, disillusioned with what was called "Socialism" in our country, conceding the fallibility of Marxist-Leninist "doctrines." But Istvan Dobi and his associates admitted no such "mistakes." Systematically and remorselessly they betrayed their country and the interests of their people.

In March 1951, a former Smallholder member of parliament called upon Istvan Dobi at his office to ask his help in the interest of a mutual friend, also a former member of parliament, who had disappeared; he had last been heard of at the Kistarcsa Concentration Camp six months previously, and his family was trying to find out what had happened to him. Dobi was highly displeased with the visit. Very loudly, for the benefit of the hidden tape recorder in the room, he said, "I cannot help and don't even want to help. Why did the man have to criticize the People's Democracy? Why did he defend the principle of private ownership? He deserves exactly what he got, and his family would do well to keep quiet about it. Otherwise they might join him." Dobi then took his caller by the arm and led him to a far corner of the room, out of the tape recorder's range, and whispered, "Why do you come here? Do you want to get me in trouble? You might as well make up your mind that I'm not going to risk my neck for anyone!" ...

There were other traitors. In the history of parliament no one ever outdid Janos Gyongyosi, a former Smallholder Minister of Foreign Affairs, in singing the praises of Rakosi. Laszlo Dernoï Kocsis, an anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi newspaperman, ploughed the same furrow in the speeches and articles he ghostwrote for Dobi. Jenő Katona defended in parliament the actions of the AVH (security police) and Communist officials who toured the countryside in 1950, bullying the peasants into joining collective farms. Jozsef Bogнар, as Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade, bears the

responsibility for signing the trade agreements with the Soviet Union.* These agreements were so disadvantageous to our country that even Kadar, the quisling administrator of Hungary, has denounced them.

There were, unfortunately, other traitors in our party, all of them followers of Dobi between 1948 and 1956. They were highly paid, and they earned their money. They lived luxuriously, extravagantly; the money some of them spent on liquor alone would have provided all the necessities for four or five families. In addition to their disproportionately large salaries, they had at their disposal the party fund, which was amply replenished each month by the State.

When the Revolt came, the traitors sat quietly in their offices, waiting to see who would come out on top. Before the Soviet intervention, when it appeared that the freedom fighters would hold their victory and the Smallholders would again take their place as the leading party in the country, they began to make little grunts and moans of ingratiating. Bogнар tried to renew relationships with former friends, veterans of the Communist prisons on whom he had until so recently turned his back. He actually had the effrontery to make a bid for the presidency of the National Bank. Dobi went tiptoeing about, trying to save himself, mouthing hypocritical words of caution about the danger of the Revolt shifting into a rightist direction. When the Soviet tanks arrived a few days later, both men shifted at once into Kadar's camp, where they remain to this day.

The First Meeting

BUT ALL WAS NOT TREASONOUS in the leadership of the Smallholders' Party. Far from it! The turncoats were only a minority, chosen and promoted, not by the rank-and-file, but by the Communist regime. The honest leaders were

* Bogнар is serving in parliament under Kadar. Kocsis is again an important newspaperman.



Istvan Dobi, left, renegade member of the Hungarian Smallholders' Party, and official Head of State, shown receiving the credentials of the then British Minister to Hungary.

Hungary (Budapest), No. 11, 1955

* MEFESZ—the Federation of Hungarian University Students. An independent youth organization, founded in 1945, forced to merge with the Communist youth group DISZ in 1948. MEFESZ was reborn in October 1956, and outlawed by the Kadar regime after the Revolt was put down.

** Dobi is now Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Republic, i.e., titular Head of State.

called together by Zoltan Tildy* on October 30 to oversee a thorough reorganization of the party. On that day some 125 men gathered at the party headquarters, 59 Zarda Street in Budapest. I was among them. It was the first time I had ever seen the inside of the place, although it was my own party headquarters. In the days of Dobi, neither I nor my companions would have been admitted, in the unlikely event that any of us would have asked (in the equally unlikely event that we had been out of Communist jails and in a position to ask). In the little group in which I was standing, we calculated that among us we had served over a hundred years in political prisons. All in all, it was a joyous reunion of old friends. In some cases eight, nine, and even ten years had passed since the last meeting.

The whereabouts of one man was uppermost in all of our minds. "Where is Bela Kovacs?"** we asked one another. "Who knows anything about him? When does he return to Budapest?" Kovacs was probably the most popular political leader in the country; certainly he was the most popular in our party. He had first come into prominence as a very young man during the Nineteen Thirties, and by the outbreak of the war was one of the outstanding Smallholder figures. In 1945 he became Secretary-General of the party, later Minister of Internal Affairs, and finally Minister of Agriculture in the coalition government of Ferenc Nagy *** which was formed in February 1946. The following year, when the all-out Communist attack on the Smallholders was launched, Kovacs was one of the first to be arrested. From that time on he served sentences for his political "crimes" in a considerable number of Soviet prisons. He was to become Chairman of the rejuvenated Smallholders' Party. We eagerly anticipated his arrival.

Jozsef Kovago,*** the former Mayor of Budapest and another veteran of Rakosi's prisons, was also in the group at party headquarters. His narrow face was more pale than I remembered it, but he was smiling. So was Istvan B. Szabo,**** Minister of Defense and later of State in the pre-Rakosi days. His home and land had been confiscated by the regime, and he had been banned for many years from his home county of Bekes. For the past few years he had worked as a laborer in Budapest, and on this occasion he was zestfully describing to his friends the most efficient way of packing crates.

Also extremely close to the hearts of the people—especially those of the countryside—was Sandor Kiss.*** In 1944 he was the leader of the Freedom Front of Hungarian Youth, formed to fight the German Nazis. He was imprisoned by the Gestapo. Later he was largely responsible for the success of the Peasant Days, organized by the Hungarian Peasant Association. On those days, tens of thousands of farmers came to Budapest to hear speeches by Kiss, Kovacs, and Ferenc Nagy. Sandor Kiss was jailed by the Communists in 1947.

* Tildy is reportedly under house arrest in Budapest.

** At the present time Kovacs is apparently living quietly in a small village in Hungary.

*** In exile in the United States.

**** Szabo is under arrest in Hungary, awaiting trial.



Press Association
Zoltan Tildy, a prominent Smallholder, and member of the coalition Governments during the Revolt.

At the meeting I met another old friend, Tivadar Partay,* a very popular member of parliament in the old days and a man of enormous courage. His hands had been mutilated in the Kistarcsa Concentration Camp.

There were many more of these old companions whom I wanted to greet, but time was passing. Istvan B. Szabo called the meeting to order and suggested that we open by singing the national anthem. Deeply moved, we stood up. . . .

In the first days of the Revolt food became scarce. There were long lines of people in front of the food stores. I had been in one of the lines for two hours when news came that Soviet tanks and troops were marching towards Budapest from the direction of Budaors. The people dispersed immediately. They swarmed toward the Square. Milk and butter and sugar were forgotten, as "experts" began breaking up the pavement, and other "experts" erected the barricades. People stood in rows, passing along the heavy stone

* Partay has been arrested, awaits trial.

squares. One group blocked the entrance to Fehervary Street. Another barricaded the point where Moricz Zsigmond Street entered the Square. Others carried the big stones to the entrance of St. Imre Herceg Street. When the barricades were finished, we sent the women and children home. Then we settled in to wait for the tanks. . . .

After the singing of the anthem, we passed a unanimous resolution, calling for the reorganization of the Smallholders' Party, and the expulsion of Istvan Dobi and his collaborating clique. An executive committee of nine members—of which I was one—was formed to outline the party's platform. Its first meeting took place immediately, but before it was over, there was an important interruption.

"Uncle" Szabo Interrupts

Three men, armed with machine guns, entered the room. The two younger ones remained at the door, while the third, an elderly, strong faced man spoke to us, "I am Janos Szabo. I come from Szena Square." It was "Uncle" Szabo, the almost legendary hero of the bitter fighting in the center of the Buda section of Budapest. During the past week his heroic deeds had become known throughout the country. He regarded the men under his command as his sons and cared for them with the tenderness of a father.*

We asked him to sit down, and he did so, loosening the sling of his gun, but not discarding the weapon. We saw him looking about, taking in the thick carpets, the luxurious furnishings. We were embarrassed by the long scrutiny and wanted to explain that we were not responsible for the furnishings. Finally he said, "I live in this neighborhood and I've been a member of the Smallholders' Party since 1945, but I have never been inside this building." Then, after a brief pause, he asked what our program was going to be. It was apparent that he was worried lest the battles he and his "sons" had fought would now be wasted.

We were able to reassure him, and the atmosphere became more relaxed. His eyes became friendly and his smile warm when we decided that we had had enough of the new building and would return to our pre-Communist regime headquarters. He offered a guard of his own men for "as long as it is necessary."

Late in the afternoon we arrived at 1 Semmelweis Street, where Szabo's men had already painted a sign, "Headquarters of the Independent Smallholders' Party." I found Zoltan Nyeste,** with whom I had taken these quarters for the party eleven years ago. Rakosi had afterward converted them into offices for the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society. There were signs of fighting inside the building, also lots of expensive-looking new furniture; for the first time in my life I saw a television set. The telephones in the main offices had a direct line to Rakosi's former residence, to Communist Headquarters, and to the Premier's office. There was a special garage and car pool for the Hungarian-Soviet Society.

* The regime has executed Janos Szabo.

** Nyeste is in exile in Munich.

Restoration of Order

THE NEXT DAY, OCTOBER 31, fighting in Budapest stopped and the Soviet troops began to withdraw. The general strike was still in progress and little work was being done, except for those who were clearing away the debris of battle. The freedom fighters returned to their homes to wash up, to sleep. There were many funerals.

In the cemetery the graves were prepared. Thirty coffins stood in a row, their covers not yet nailed down. Women walked past them, lifting the covers, searching for missing relatives. The mother of our dead friend moved numbly from coffin to coffin. After awhile she found the body of her son, whose strong character and spiritual fortitude had been such a help to us during the terrible years in Recsk Concentration Camp. . . .

The first problem for the Revolt leaders was restoration of order. The free radio called on the workers to return to their enterprises. Bus transport commenced again. The post office opened. The Electric Company employees renewed service. Only a very few people took advantage of the situation, and the admirable discipline which had prevailed during the fighting broke only in isolated instances. Once I saw a young man at the corner of Rakosi Street carrying two typewriters and refusing to answer the questions of some freedom fighters as to where he had gotten them. Other people—very few, certainly—were under the strange impression that the Revolt had been fought so that they might get back their factories and land holdings. I heard that a certain Count Almasy called on Imre Nagy, demanding that his estates be returned. This was one of the so-called "counterrevolutionaries" whose number and importance Janos Kadar and the Soviets were to exaggerate so fantastically in the ensuing months.

Distributing Food

We had opened our offices at Smallholder Headquarters on October 31, and three thousand people flooded the premises that day seeking satisfaction for their grievances against the Communist regime. Because of the crowds and because of the fact that some of the complaints were unjustified, we initiated a system whereby only those accompanied by Zoltan Sztaray* were permitted to enter or leave the building. By late afternoon the press of the crowd became so great that the tired sentries failed to recognize Sztaray himself and once he had to wait downstairs for someone to come and fetch him from the offices. A concentration camp veteran and one of the MEFESZ leaders in 1945, Sztaray was also an agricultural expert and during the Revolt had been one of those in charge of food distribution. The rural population had sent hundreds of truckloads of pork, sugar, bread and fats to the city. Many of these trucks came directly to our party headquarters, and Sztaray would route them to the fighting men, the hospitals, or wherever they were most needed. It is typical of his attitude that on one occasion he distributed several truckloads of food, forgetting that he—and we who were helping him—had had nothing to eat. Returning to our homes late that night, we

* Sztaray is in exile in Paris.



Press Association

Bela Kovacs, Smallholder leader, and member of the coalition Governments during the Revolt.

all dined on slices of week-old bread.

The reorganization of our party in Budapest was supervised by Jozsef Kovago (who on November 3 was re-elected Mayor of Budapest by the National Committee). Within 24 hours after Imre Nagy's abolition of the one-party system, there were Smallholder branches in each district of the city. We were especially gratified at the number of manual workers who joined our organization. The first issue of the party organ, *Kiss Ujsag*, appeared under the editorship of Dezso Futo,* who had demonstrated exceptional courage in 1945-46 with his editorial castigations of the security police.

Bela Kovacs Arrives

On November 1, Bela Kovacs, whose arrival we had all anticipated so eagerly at our October 30 meeting, came at last to Budapest. At our headquarters he was greeted with joyful enthusiasm and profound compassion, for the years in Communist jails had marked him. The man we had known in the old days was tall and erect, broad-shouldered, with strong, firm features. The man standing before us now was haggard and bent; he regarded us with sad, hurt eyes. He looked more like a retired scientist than the most popular leader of the Hungarian peasantry. The

hot-tempered, energetic Bela Kovacs whom we had known had disappeared in Communist prisons. The figure before us, carefully picking his words, was a different person. In the middle of a sentence he would get up suddenly and begin to pace the floor, four short steps forward, four back. We recognized the movement; all of us had done it countless times in our prison cells. We told Kovacs that the Smallholders' Executive Committee had decided to offer him the chairmanship of the party. He declined at first, recommending Ferenc Nagy for the job, but, in the face of our great confidence and affectionate persuasion, finally accepted. The previous day at a party organizational meeting in Baranya County, he had made a brief statement which is a perfect summation of our party's viewpoint, and which, incidentally, proves that despite the physical toll of the years in prison the man was basically unchanged:

"I believe that no one should even dream of a return to the old order. The world of bankers, counts and capitalists is finished in Hungary. Those who still think along the lines of either 1939 or 1956 do not truly represent the Smallholders' Party."

Smallholders Enter Government

ON OCTOBER 27 Imre Nagy had formed a government which included Smallholders Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs (this was one of a series of increasingly liberal governments formed before the Soviet intervention). This government, however, was not at first able to function fully or independently. A tight tank cordon surrounded Communist Party Headquarters on Akademia Street, and the Premier was kept there, virtually a prisoner. He was permitted to see people only in the presence of AVH men, who took notes on all that transpired. For several days Soviet tanks also "protected" the Parliament Building as well as the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Under these conditions much responsibility devolved on Tildy, the new Minister of State. Of all the government leaders he, perhaps, saw the situation most clearly. He held from the first that all the demands of the people should be granted, that only by doing so, could the new government take its place at the head of the revolution.

A large crowd gathered at mid-day before the building of the University of Economics on Dimitrov Square. They were reading mimeographed copies of the 16-point list of Demands of the Hungarian University Youth. There were not enough copies to go around, and people clustered happily together, sometimes as many as thirty or forty around a single sheet of paper. They were very proud of the students. "These are old demands," said a man next to me. "Some of us demonstrated for them back before the First World War." I looked at his gray hair, his deeply furrowed face, his shining, cheerful eyes. "This man has faith in me," I thought, and I was as proud of the 16 points as if I had been present when they were drawn up.

I keep thinking of the old man's confident eyes. He was old, his body was broken by hard labor, but his eyes were young and full of expectation. They have faith, the old ones; they rely on us, their sons, hoping we will be strong enough. . . .

* Futo is in a small village in Hungary.

Talks with Mikoyan

IT WAS TILDY TOO who saw the necessity of procuring a declaration on the Hungarian events from the Soviet Union. For this purpose he arranged on Wednesday, Oct. 31, a meeting with the special Soviet representative in our country, Anastas Mikoyan. The conference took place in a private apartment. Mikoyan declared that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering in Hungary's domestic affairs and that the Soviet government had full confidence in Imre Nagy. He promised that those of the Soviet troops whose presence in our country was permitted by the Warsaw Pact would be withdrawn from Budapest to their Hungarian bases and that those who had no "legal" right to be in the country would be called back to the Soviet Union. Tildy asked Mikoyan what his government thought of the multi-party system and the forthcoming free elections. The Soviet official declared that these were Hungarian problems and refused even to comment on them. Then the meeting was terminated.

The statements made by Mikoyan became widely known throughout the country. General Pal Maleter* referred to them on November 2 when he told Western newspapermen that "Zoltan Tildy had a conference with Mr. Mikoyan on Wednesday." No one, however, has satisfactorily explained the enigma of Mikoyan's words. The Soviet official had not appeared to favor the Rakosi clique. Indeed it was he who had come to Budapest in July 1956 to arrange for the ouster and replacement of the former Communist Party chief. This took place after Rakosi had dissolved the Petofi Circle** in retribution for statements made in a debate justifying the Poznan riots.*** Mikoyan at that time had instructed Hegedus and Gero**** to come to an understanding with Imre Nagy, and this proved to be the first step in Nagy's "rehabilitation." Under these circumstances there was a disposition to trust Mikoyan somewhat more than the other members of the Soviet hierarchy. Whether this trust was justified is, in the light of later events, doubtful. But it is, of course, possible that Mikoyan was used by his government to play the role of an uninformed go-between in the terrible drama of the Soviet intervention. Probably it will never be known whether he was acting in good faith when he deliberately created the impression that the Soviet Union was willing to accept the changes brought about by the Revolt. Only the Moscow rulers can state with certainty that Mikoyan did or did not know of the moves launched by Soviet forces in the outlying parts of Hungary on October 28-29, of the further troop deployments on November

1, 2 and 3, of the final plan for Janos Kadar to call for Soviet intervention on November 4.

Tildy in his functions as Minister of State also played a decisive part in winning the support of the religious leaders for the Nagy government. On November 1, he and Maleter conferred with Cardinal Mindszenty and on the following day Tildy saw Endre Hamvas, the Bishop of Csanad. Concurrently the new regime received the backing of Protestant churchmen. Bishop Revesz was returned to his duties on November 1, and next day the Lutherans again elected Bishop Lajos Ordas* as their leader. Both Revesz and Ordas had been removed from office by Rakosi.

Meanwhile non-Communist influence grew even stronger in the new leadership. On October 30, Tildy and Kovacs were two of only five Ministers of State, and on November 3, Istvan B. Szabo of the Smallholders' Party also became one of the Ministers of State. In this government, which was the last free one on Hungarian territory, there were three Smallholders, three Social Democrats, two Petofi Party members, one independent and only three Communists in leading posts. On November 3, the Executive Committee of the Smallholders' Party issued a statement assuring the government and our party's representatives in the government of our confidence.

United Agrarian Party

ANOTHER IMPORTANT MATTER which came before the Smallholders' Executive Committee was the possibility of forming a united agrarian party, combining its own membership with that of the Petofi Party (formerly the National Peasant Party). The two organizations had worked together as far back as 1939 in the Hungarian Peasant Association, although at that time the National Peasant Party (as it was called until the Revolt) had no political weight comparable to that of the Smallholders. Its significance grew after the war, however, when it became the fourth party in the coalition government of 1945. (The Smallholders, the Social Democrats, and the Communists were the other three.) Rakosi had given a certain amount of assistance and encouragement to the National Peasant Party, not because it was Communist-dominated at the time, but because he hoped to divide the peasantry, to prevent them from being unified in the Smallholders' Party. This attitude of the Communist regime caused misunderstandings; but the fact that the National Peasant Party was no mere branch of the Communist Party had been borne out when Imre Kovacs,** its Secretary-General, was forced to leave the country. Several other independent National Peasant Party leaders were subsequently arrested.

For many of us, the climate was ripe for a merger of the two agrarian parties, and when Sandor Kiss announced the re-formation of the Hungarian Peasant Association on October 30, 1956, the vehicle was at hand. Not all the Executive Committee of the Smallholders were in favor of

* Maleter is still in jail awaiting trial.

** The Petofi Circle was a pre-Revolt group of militant intellectuals. For an account of its rise by its President, Pal Jonas, see *East Europe*, July 1957, pages 17-27.

*** Polish workers in Poznan rioted on June 28, 1956, demanding "bread and freedom."

**** Andras Hegedus succeeded Imre Nagy as Premier in 1955. Erno Gero was Communist Party chief after Rakosi was deposed in 1956. Both these Stalinists are now in the Soviet Union.

* Apparently none of these religious leaders has been arrested. Cardinal Mindszenty is still in refuge at the US Embassy in Budapest. Bishop Ordas visited the United States in August.

** Imre Kovacs has been in exile in the US since 1950.



This battered daguerreotype is the only extant photograph of Sandor Petofi, the great Nineteenth Century Hungarian poet. Petofi's statue was the focus of the demonstration of students on October 23, 1956, the beginning of the Revolt.

Hungary (Budapest), September-October 1955

the unified party, but the majority of the younger generation supported the movement, and a great many of the older leaders—including Bela Kovacs and Ferenc Nagy—

still considered the creation of a unified peasant party their most important task. In the bloody aftermath of the Revolt, however, there was no opportunity for the implementation of our plans.

On November 3, the Executive Committee stayed in the office until late at night. We knew of the Soviet troop movements and realized that the freedom we had won at the sacrifice of so many lives, and indeed the fate of our government, depended solely on the actions of the Soviet Union. During those anxious hours we elected Jozsef Kovago to the post of Secretary-General of the Smallholders' Party. As his Deputy we named Ferenc Vidovics,* who in 1945 was the Chief Sheriff of Somogy County and had only recently been freed from prison.

It was getting very late by then, and we decided to go home, hoping to spend a pleasant Sunday, a restful holiday. However, the next day was no holiday. It turned out to be a day of most outrageous crime and brutality. A nation was murdered. After November 4, we managed to meet a few times, but all hope gradually died in our hearts. Finally we had to make a decision, and those of us who had learned through first-hand experience the horrors of Communist prisons, made up our minds to leave our homeland.

Now we listen to news from home with heavy hearts. We learn of the arrests, the disappearances, the executions of our friends. In addition to the actual criminals involved, we feel that the free world is partially responsible for the terrible events which took place and are still taking place in Hungary. We speak for our friends, for the whole Hungarian nation, when we say that the only hope left to us now is that the conscience of the free world will awaken. Here rests the future of the Hungarian people.

* Vidovics is in exile in the US.

Khrushchev's Secret Speech

THE POLISH WEEKLY *Przekroj*, September 15, 1957, points out "some interesting features" in the latest volumes of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. The weekly notes that the biography of Soviet Party boss Nikita Khrushchev, in Volume 46, mentions the famous "secret speech" Khrushchev delivered to a closed session of the Soviet Party's Twentieth Congress, February 1956, in which he bitterly assailed Stalin for his crimes and blunders. "This," *Przekroj* said, "is probably the first public Soviet mention of the speech."

The new volume also furnished biographies and photographs of two old Bolsheviks purged by Stalin and long in official oblivion: Nikolai Chaplin, a founder of the youth organization Komsomol, and Vlas Chubar, prominent Ukrainian Communist and alternate member of the Soviet Politburo. Both men were purged in 1939.

In addition, *Przekroj* notes that the new Volume 47 of the Encyclopedia omits the biography of Dmitri Shepilov. Volume 47 states that it was printed in April 1957, but Shepilov did not fall from Party leadership until the purge in June.



Propaganda photos giving the official version of the Communists' collectivization policy in the year before the Hungarian Revolt. Above: Mihaly Nagy and his wife discuss which is better, "working by ourselves or cooperating with the others." Opposite: His mind made up, Mihaly Nagy reports to the council secretary. "I am not an individually working peasant anymore, I'm joining the Petofti co-op!"

Hungary (Budapest), No. 11, 1955

The Party and the Peasant—II

This article, second in a series on Satellite agriculture, covers the history and defeat of collectivization in Hungary. The previous article (October issue) surveyed the farm problem in Eastern Europe and analyzed last year's peasant victory in Poland. Subsequent installments will deal with collective farming in the other Satellites and with agriculture in general.

Hungary

SINCE 1948 the Hungarian Communists have been engaged in a losing struggle to collectivize agriculture. Their unwillingness—or their inability—to extirpate the independent peasant as ruthlessly as Stalin did in the Soviet Union has been one of the key weaknesses in their agricultural policy. Failing to collectivize, and yet never abandoning the effort to do so, they were forced to rely upon half-measures and to carry on a long "cold war" with the peasantry which they were unable to win. These tactics only prevented any improvement in farm output, without enhancing the power of the regime to extract an economic surplus from the countryside. Hungary today is farther removed from "large-scale farming" than it was before the war.

Collectivization went faster and more ruthlessly than in

Poland, reaching its high point in the summer of 1953. At that time the collectivized sector embraced slightly more than a quarter of the arable land. However, the program had still not captured enough of the countryside to displace the independent peasant as the main supplier of farm produce. In 1952 the small and medium peasants produced 70 percent of the total grain crop and accounted for more than 60 percent of the State's grain collections. The role of the ordinary peasant was more important than it had been before the Communists took power. The effect of the postwar land reform had been a great enlargement of the small and medium peasant strata, at the expense of the large estates, and the effect of the collectivization campaign had been chiefly to reduce the importance of the more prosperous peasants, or "kulaks," in the pro-

duction of the agricultural surplus. Thus the Communist State found itself dependent upon small-scale farmers—with less than 15 hectares—at the very time it was seeking to collectivize them. An outline of this development can be seen in the figures given below.*

Sector	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total State Grain Collections
<i>1938</i>			
working peasant farms	51.6	47.4	43.6
kulak farms	24.2	63.6	27.4
holdings over 200 cadastral acres	24.2	67.0	29.0
total	100.0	55.9	100.0
<i>1949</i>			
working peasant farms	82.1	38.3	75.3
kulak farms	16.4	59.9	23.5
"Socialist" sector	1.5	31.7	1.2
total	100.0	41.7	100.0
<i>1952</i>			
working peasant farms	69.6	41.7	61.4
kulak farms	5.5	61.0	7.2
"Socialist" sector	24.9	59.6	31.4
total	100.0	47.4	100.0

It is now clear that in Hungary, as in Poland, the Communists did not themselves agree on the proper solution of the agricultural problem. By 1953 many Party members recognized that the policies of Stalin and Rakosi were economically ruinous for Hungary, and these Communists found a spokesman and leader in Imre Nagy. He became Premier for the first time in July of 1953, after three years of forced industrialization had brought the country to a point of crisis. Hungary then entered upon its so-called "New Course."***

In his first speech on July 4, 1953, Nagy admitted that the Communists had attempted to industrialize Hungary at a pace far beyond the country's capacity. "We have to note, and we have to state frankly before the whole country, that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength. Its implementation is greatly overtaxing our resources. It is hampering the growth of the material foundations of the country's welfare, and has recently resulted in a deteriorating standard of living." While the industrialization program was "exaggerated," the effort to improve agriculture had been wholly inadequate.

*The first two columns are taken from an article by Mrs. Aladar Mod in *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), April-May 1953. The third column was calculated from the first two.

**The reasons for the change in policy were complex. Nagy's tenure of power (July 1953-April 1955) roughly coincided with Malenkov's predominance in Moscow. The "New Course," which was carried further in Hungary than in the other Satellites, reflected the milder policies announced in the USSR by Malenkov, the troubled situation in East Europe as dramatized by the riots in Pilsen and East Berlin, and the strains in the Hungarian economy resulting from the unbalanced economic program of the preceding years.

quate. "Agricultural production has been stagnating, and during the past few years its growth has been hampered by meager investments, lack of support to independent peasants and a far too rapid development of collective farms which is neither economically nor politically justifiable and has made the peasantry's work insecure." He declared that the regime had treated the peasants too harshly.

"During the land collectivization program, too much bullying was practiced. This not only offended the peasant's sense of justice, but also caused serious harm to our economy and played an important part in bringing about the present state of affairs. . . . The violation of the principle of voluntary collective farm membership has particularly created unrest. . . . On the other hand, excessive measures against the kulaks have resulted in . . . difficulties for the State in utilizing the so-called 'land reserves.' . . . In fact, these remained uncultivated."

In a crucial passage of his speech he declared that henceforth collectivization ought to be based on the voluntary acceptance of it by the peasant. Moreover, those who wanted to leave existing collectives would be allowed to do so.

"In order to insure complete respect for the principle of voluntary membership, the government has decided, in future, to allow members of collective farms who desire to carry on farming individually (because they have found it to be a better proposition), to leave the collectives after the end of the present harvest and, even further, to authorize the dissolution of collective farms in which the majority of members express such a desire."

This promise, couched in qualifications, was submerged in the middle of an hour-long speech. The specific intention was not made clear, but it is doubtful if Nagy anticipated what followed. In the ensuing months the peasants deserted the collective farms in thousands. By the end of 1953 membership in the collectives was less than 60 percent of what it had been a year before. Twelve percent of the collective farms had been dissolved. During 1954 the collectivized sector continued to decline as can be seen from the figures on page 22, reaching a low point of about 230,000 members or roughly half the number it had had before Nagy made his speech.

While the Party continued to proclaim collectivization as the ultimate goal in agriculture, it devoted its efforts during this time to encouraging productivity by the independent peasants, particularly those medium-sized farmers who provided the bulk of agricultural output. A number of concessions were offered: reductions in delivery quotas, increases in prices for above-quota deliveries, and greater freedom to dispose of surplus crops on the free market. In addition the regime undertook to raise investment in agriculture and in that sector of industry producing fertilizers and farm implements.

The Middle Peasant and the "Kulak"

THE GUIDING slogan of the Communists in their rural campaign had been Lenin's formula, "Rely upon the poor peasant; enter into alliance with the middle peasant;

and fight against the kulak." The Communists sought to dramatize the agricultural problem in terms of a class struggle, with the "kulak" cast as a village bourgeois and the "poor peasant" as a village proletarian. While the meaning of the term "kulak" has tended to be somewhat flexible according to the political needs of the moment, in Hungary it was officially defined as a farmer owning more than 25 cadastral hold (14.25 hectares) or employing workers other than members of his immediate family. A "middle peasant," similarly, was a farmer owning from 10 to 25 hold (about 5.7 to 14.25 hectares) and not employing help other than members of his immediate family. It was assumed that the kulak was neither a potential nor a desirable recruit to collectivized farming, that because of his property-owning and labor-exploiting mentality he was bound to be hostile to "Socialism" and ought to be treated as an enemy of the people. During the collectivization campaign in the Soviet Union the kulak was given no mercy; he was "liquidated." In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the Communists merely sought to restrict and discourage the kulak and prevent his gaining any profit from the industrialization program. Restrictions on the kulaks took the form of discriminatory taxation and higher delivery quotas, as well as social ostracism and other methods of harassment. The purpose was evidently a double one: to squeeze the kulaks to such a point that they would cease to have any future as a "class," and to split away the broad stratum of "medium peasants" who would then, presumably, be drawn toward the Party.

By 1953 it was clear that this policy was not succeeding in Hungary. The middle peasant had not been won to the Communist view, he had in fact been antagonized by the collectivization drive. The significance of this was emphasized in a November 3 broadcast over the Hungarian Home Service in which the speaker told his audience that "the middle peasantry is economically if not numerically the most significant stratum of the agricultural population. Nearly 50 percent of the privately-owned land is still in their hands."

"Without winning over the middle peasant, without his active cooperation, it would be quite impossible to create a Socialist agriculture in the country. An agreement must be reached with the middle peasant, without, however, renouncing for a second the fight against the kulak, or relying exclusively on the support of the poor peasant. . . . As Lenin explained, the middle peasant is not an enemy, but he is, has been, and always will be, hesitant. It is our task to influence the hesitant."

The speaker concluded by condemning the district and local organs for their many "mistakes" and abuses in dealing with the middle peasant.

Another broadcast on April 12, 1954, emphasized that a key task of the new program was to conciliate the middle peasant. The speaker, Lenard Gabor, admitted that it was primarily the poor peasants who had remained in the collective farms, and that a further development of the collectives "cannot be imagined without the participation of the middle peasant."

"In many places the middle peasant was mishandled. In our Party organization and Party leadership the middle

peasant is a rarity. . . . It is beyond doubt that the kulak still has an influence on the middle peasant. Whose task is it to change this? If the middle peasant is indeed our ally, then why does he turn his back on the collective farms? We have many reasons to be angry with the kulak, but it is no wonder that the kulak has remained a kulak, that the enemy is an enemy and is endeavoring to entice the wavering middle peasant. This has always been so and will always remain so. . . ."

This testimony to the importance of the "middle peasant" was repeated on many occasions. Basic in it was the realization that Hungary's economy could not afford a prolonged slump in farm deliveries, and that collectivization must not be pursued at the cost of demoralizing the chief supplier. The logic was put very simply by Matyas Rakosi in a report to the Politburo on October 31, 1953. Under the previous policy, he said, "we wanted to meet increased needs by cutting down the quantities of products which the peasantry could sell on the free market. And to top it all, we granted less and less artificial fertilizer, fewer implements and mechanical services to individually working peasants who formed the large majority of the agricultural population—a policy which did not, of course, facilitate an increase in production. The cumulative effect of all this was that peasants were disinclined to increase production. In addition, . . . thousands of individually working peasants simply left the land and went into industry and State farms where they were better off. Hence the measures taken at the present stage by our Party and Government . . . have merely remedied the mistakes we had previously committed. . . ."

However, the effort to appease the independent peasantry did not produce the quick results that may have been hoped for. Despite marked reductions in the burden of compulsory deliveries and numerous other concessions designed to spur output, the quantity of produce made available to the State was much less than what was needed. Official spokesmen began to complain that kulaks and other "class enemies" were sabotaging the delivery program. The Party newspaper *Szabad Nep* said on June 23, 1955:

"Last year, kulaks and speculators in the villages grew much stronger. They have in every way endeavored to loosen the discipline among citizens, they have hampered the fulfillment of the delivery schedule, and they have not even fulfilled the reduced harvesting project. There were villages where 10 to 12 percent of grain deliveries were padded out by corn, sunflower seed or potatoes. The whole working population suffered because of this, since less grain was delivered to the State stores for public supply. In addition to this, we were unable to fulfill the grain sowing schedule in the autumn of 1953. That is why, in order to supply the public, we were forced to import part of the bread grain from abroad. Every single quintal of this imported grain had to be paid for in foreign currency."

Erno Gero, at that time First Deputy Premier, gave an even starker description of the problem (*Szabad Nep*, June 12, 1955):

"During the past year we have been forced to import large quantities of bread grains and fodder as well as sugar



Hoeing corn on the Liberation Collective Farm in Szentes.

Hungary (Budapest), July 1955

and fats. . . . In previous years, we exported bread grains and sugar, and it is not a normal procedure that a grain-exporting country should suddenly turn into a grain-importing country. The absolute value of our agricultural exports dropped between 1950 and 1954, and the share of agriculture in our total exports fell from 43 percent to 27 percent."

Rakosi's Return

THE RESIGNATION of Malenkov as Premier of the USSR in February, 1955, was followed very shortly by Nagy's ouster in Hungary. The fall of the two men was accompanied by a new shift in economic policies which emphasized a return to the general economic goals of the Stalin era. A resolution issued by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party on March 4 criticized Imre Nagy for holding "rightist, anti-Marxist, anti-Party and opportunist views" with respect to Hungary's economic development.

"Particularly great harm has been done by those right-wing views . . . which have appeared concerning the main issues of the Party's agrarian policy. . . . Certain petty-bourgeois theories, crushed by Marxism long ago, have been revived and even published in some periodicals concerned with theory. . . . On the basis of [various] false tenets, some people began to deny the imperative necessity of the Socialist transformation of agriculture, and, under this pretext, started to wreck the collectivization movement. Such views are largely responsible for the fact that

there was no numerical increase in our collective farms last year. . . ."

The resolution pointed to the nub of Hungary's agricultural problem: the peasantry's silent resistance to the purposes of the Communist State:

"Some Party members have adopted an incorrect attitude on the question of produce collection. It is due to this right-wing attitude and to the undermining work of the kulaks that in 1954 even the correctly-reduced surrender [delivery] plan was not fulfilled. The importance of produce collection was not sufficiently stressed, and the slackening of discipline in produce collection was watched idly. . . ."

It went on to chart a new compromise between reality and ideology, promising to continue the concessions to the peasants and at the same time to expand the collectivized sector:

"The Central Committee . . . clearly sees the opportunities inherent in the development of the production of individual peasant farms. . . . However, being aware of the limits to which small-scale peasant farming can be developed, the Central Committee deems it necessary that, by observing the voluntary principle laid down by Lenin, the Party and State authorities should do widespread political, economic and organizational work in the interests of the consolidation and enlargement of the collective farm movement. . . ."

This pronouncement was followed in April and June by two other Central Committee resolutions stressing the

importance of the agricultural problem and attacking the "right-wing views" of Nagy and his followers. The June resolution declared bluntly that the desired improvement in agricultural production was not to be sought at the expense of further collectivization. "The two principal tasks—the Socialist reorganization of agriculture and the development of agricultural production—must be solved jointly." However, the resolution went on to discuss the goal of collectivization in very cautious language. "In conformity with the resolution of the Third Party Congress, the collectivization movement must be developed quantitatively through the voluntary enlistment of independent farmers . . . at a pace which would permit the Socialist sector of agriculture to gain predominance by the end of the Second Five Year Plan [end of 1960]." The language was not accidental, since it was repeated on other occasions, notably in the draft of the Second Five Year Plan published a year later. Since the "Socialist sector" of agriculture included the substantial category of State farms (which possessed about 13 percent of the arable land in 1955), the statement seemed to imply a goal for collective farms of at least 37 percent of the arable land by 1960. But this increase would not have carried the collectivized area very far beyond what it had been in June 1953, before the Premiership of Nagy, when it comprised about 28 percent of the arable land.

Thus in 1955 the Hungarian Communists were less prepared than ever to launch an assault upon the independent peasantry. In the words of Matyas Rakosi, then once again in full control:

"For many long years to come, there will be tens and hundreds of thousands of independent farmers. If we forget this fact in our work, it would undoubtedly give the impression that the Party and the government cared less than they do for the independent farmers. The spreading of such a wrong view would cause very serious harm to the People's Democracy and to the peasantry itself. This misconception should be dispelled at all costs. We do, and we shall, adhere to the decision of the Central Committee, which clearly states that we will continue to give the same support as before to the independent farmers, as expounded in the June 1953 resolution. . . ." (Radio Budapest, March 26, 1955.)

Second Offensive

THE CHIEF METHODS of getting peasants into collectives continued to be: (1) political and social pressure, (2) economic and financial support for collective farms and (3) social benefits for the members of collective farms. For example, on July 30 a decree was published announcing that collective farms would be specifically favored in receiving supplies of seed grains, graftings, insecticides, small machines and other equipment, in the conclusion of contracts for breeding and fattening livestock, and in the extension of loans (Radio Budapest, July 30, 1955). In similar fashion a notice in the peasant newspaper *Szabad Fold* on August 21 promised the following privileges to members of collectives: free medical treatment, family allowances, maternity benefits, pensions, tax relief, and

reduced delivery quotas on the produce from family plots. At the same time the regime took steps to close the door of the collective on the peasant after he had entered, by decreeing that membership was compulsory for at least three years and that members who left after that period were not entitled to receive the same land they had brought in (they were to be compensated by land of "equal value" but in such a way as not to break up the collective fields).

Another device which the regime began to employ systematically was to encourage the formation of cooperative groups and other associations among the peasantry organized on a looser basis than the true collective farm. In their simplest form they consisted of groups who got together temporarily for cultivation or marketing or the purchase of machinery. There were also specialized associations devoted to vine growing or animal breeding. On a more advanced level were the so-called Type I and Type II cooperatives, differing from the Type III cooperatives (collective farms like the Russian kolkhoz) in that the members cultivated their land individually (Type I) or at least had certain vestigial ownership rights such as sharing in the proceeds of the collective according to the amount of property they had contributed (Type II). In earlier years the Communists had emphasized Type III collective farms predominantly, and in 1955 these formed about three-quarters of the total number. The new collectivization effort which began in 1955 still held to the Type III collective as the ultimate goal for agriculture, but attempted to make the transition easier by encouraging peasants to join collectives or cooperative groups of some



Storing corn at the Felsobabad Collective Farm.

Hungary (Budapest), September-October 1955



"He who rises early finds gold." This old Hungarian proverb is faithfully observed by Ferenc Bodnár and his wife who go out to work their own land at daybreak."

Hungary (Budapest), June 1954

"simpler" kind. "In this way," said one editorial, "the working peasants may be convinced from their own experience as to the advantages of collectives. They will progress step-by-step, in the meantime acquiring the habit of working together. . . . Simpler forms are more easily understood by everyone, and thus they serve better to convince people of the usefulness of collective life." (*Szabad Fold*, January 23, 1955.)

The success of the collectivization campaign in 1955 and 1956 is difficult to measure, shrouded as it was in official claims that failed to reveal very much. Statements made after the Revolt by officials of the Kadar regime imply that by September 1956 there were approximately 5,000 collective farms (including all three types) with more than 300,000 members. These figures were substantially below the peak reached at the end of 1952, when there were claimed to be 5,315 collective farms and 446,900 members. Whether the new tactics might have succeeded in attaining the goal set for 1960 is a question left unanswered in the rubble of the Revolt.

What Happened in Somogy

AS THE SUMMER of 1956 wore on, the surface of Rakosi's Hungary began to heave from the rebellious pressures at work underneath it. In July the dictator left, to be replaced by his lieutenant Erno Gero. The mounting criticism by writers and other intellectuals brought into public discussion many problems that had long been taboo, and among them was the logic of the regime's collective farm policy. The September issue of *Csillag*, the magazine of the Hungarian Writers' Union, contained an article by Istvan Markus, a rural sociologist, entitled "The Summing Up of Somogy." Markus and three associates had studied the history of four villages in the county of Somogy: Hedrehely, Som, Fono and Vesc. They found that collectivization had succeeded at first among the very poor peasants, who had nothing to lose, but that when the

regime attempted to collectivize the "medium" peasants it encountered opposition. This opposition, which became apparent by 1950, had led the authorities to employ force: "general restriction of peasants with small and medium acreages; repression of the class of large farmers and the upper strata of the medium peasantry, with the subsequent intimidation of the others; a considerable restriction of civil rights; increasingly rough treatment . . . of the independent peasants." These policies, although serving to increase the collectivized sector, at the same time demoralized those peasants who clung to their farms. "In all four of the investigated villages . . . tillage and animal husbandry . . . deteriorated; the deterioration accelerated in 1952; the acreage of abandoned, uncultivated and scarcely cultivated plowland increased; the stock of cattle, horses and hogs not only failed to increase but diminished. . . . For these reasons plans for crop rotation broke down and very often wheat followed wheat, corn followed corn, a practice hitherto much condemned by every farmer in Hungary." Another result was that peasants ceased to invest in their farms.

"The peasant spent his income . . . on clothing, food, bicycles, radios, furniture. The increase in rural consumption, the rise of the living standard even during the worst years stem from these facts. Procurement and repair of means of production; erection of farm buildings; maintenance, provision, medication, propagation of livestock; providing, saving and distribution of reserves in products and seeds, etc., thus became more and more the task of the Government. . . ."

A significant change for the better, according to Markus, occurred in 1953 when Imre Nagy's regime put a halt to the policy of force and allowed peasants to leave the collective farms. "The results of the methods of organization in the county of Somogy were that the very minute the peasants felt a slackening of the pressure compelling them to remain in the collectives, and the return to independent farming was permitted, the mass of them deserted the collectives." The peasants who left were mainly those

Distribution of Arable Land in Hungary
(Percent)

Sector	1949	1955
State Farms and Enterprises	1.2	13.1
Farms under Village Management	—	1.5
Collective Farms*	0.8	16.1
Household Plots of Collective Farms	—	1.8
Independent Farms	98.0	67.5

*At its highest point, in June 1953, the collective farm sector embraced 27.9 percent of the arable land. In December of 1953 the proportion was 20.0 percent. No estimate is available for 1956, but the figure was probably not much above that given for 1955. After the October Revolt the collective farms lost about half their land; a reasonable estimate of their holdings in April 1957 would be not greater than 9 percent of the arable land.

The figures in the table are taken from *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv 1956* (Budapest) and refer to the end of each year.

who had been collectivized by the use of force between 1951 and 1953, and the collective farms which dissolved were mainly those which had been organized during that time. "The wave of withdrawal dramatized the criticism of the majority of the village—consisting of peasants of small and medium-sized acreages—against the methods used to organize collectives during those years."

When the new drive for collectivization began in 1955 after the fall of Nagy's regime and the return of Rakosi to full power, it was publicized as being "voluntary" in nature, and the harsh tactics of former years were repudiated. But Markus charged that "the various forms of direct force" were applied "more openly and more generally than during 1951-52. . . ."

"During the fall of 1955 a 'brigade' arrived at the village of Som, consisting of functionaries of the Province, County, Party and Government. During the first few days an initial phase of agitation mildly ran its course. . . . Some [peasants] concurred, the majority did not. . . . On the third or fourth week [the brigade] switched to the following method of agitation: from the local council notice was sent to the peasants to appear before them under penalty of 300 forint fine. . . . The summoned peasants were admitted to the brigade one by one, the turn of some coming after midnight. The essence of the pronouncement was this: whoever fails to join resists the building of Socialism; whoever resists certifies that he does not want Socialism; whoever does not want Socialism is in essence an enemy of Socialism; and whoever is an enemy should not expect any consideration. In these discussions, exactly as in [police] interrogations, friendly behavior was sometimes mixed with cursing and rough intimidation. The peasants slowly softened. . . ."

The substance of Markus' argument was not in opposition to Socialized agriculture as such, but to the regime's policies which had sacrificed productive efficiency in agriculture to dogmatism and centralized control. "This [type of] 'solution' was fit to promote the collapse and abandonment of individually worked farms, thus the consolidation of these lands in large-scale farms, but was unfit to create economically viable large-scale farms. . . ." He proposed that if future collectivization was to be successful it should meet the following demands of the peasants: (1) they should be allowed to choose their own members when forming collectives, and even to accept "kulaks" if they so desired; (2) they should have the maximum of liberty in conducting their operations; (3) they should be allowed to purchase and maintain their own agricultural machines rather than to employ the services of government-run Machine Tractor Stations—a proposal which Markus called "the essence" of his program.

His article was the subject of a debate at the now-famous Petofi Circle in Budapest on September 25. Most of the participants were reported to have agreed that "fundamental changes" were needed in the regime's agricultural policy (*Szabad Ifjusag* [Budapest], September 27):

"The hall was jam-packed. . . . Scientists, collective farm chairmen, writers, agricultural experts and the leaders of village councils attended. . . . The discussion lasted until after midnight. The speakers all, without exception,

took the position that collectivization is necessary but criticized its defects."

The weekly peasant newspaper published by the Communist Party, *Szabad Fold*, said in its October 7 issue that the Markus article was an excellent one. It declared:

"The summary of the experiences acquired in Somogy County shows that there is something wrong with the development of agriculture along Socialist lines. The leaders of the great drive for collectivization which began in 1949 in Somogy County, and we may add in other districts, disregarded the prevailing conditions, the social and economic situation; thus in more than one case collectivization was forced in a direction disliked by the village, against the will of the mass of the peasantry."

And the same paper carried in its issue of October 21 an article by Istvan Dobi (then, as now, chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly) in which he admitted "serious mistakes" and "unscrupulousness of shocking proportion" in the campaign to organize collectives. He also admitted that "many thousands of good individual farms were put out of production and bad collective farms substituted, poorly run by disillusioned, embittered men."

This sort of discussion, carried on under Communist auspices, showed that within the Party there was deep cleavage between those who wanted to continue collectivizing and those who were opposed. The language of the opponents was very similar to that of Gomulka's supporters in Poland. They did not oppose collective farming as such, nor the effort to propagandize in favor of it, but their insistence that it be truly voluntary and economically viable would have put an end to any large-scale program. Moreover, the proposal of Markus that collective farms be permitted to have their own heavy machinery was directed against the system of State control that functioned through the Machine Tractor Stations. It is reasonable to assume that many of those who favored these proposals were not so much concerned with improving the collective farms as with abolishing them.



Sowing summer wheat on the Petofi Collective Farm in Heves County.
Hungary (Budapest), No. 4, 1956

The Peasant Wins Another Round

THE NATIONAL ferment grew swiftly. The fighting that broke out on October 23 swept Imre Nagy and his followers back into power, but the "liberal" faction of the Party was unable to stem the course of events. Real power quickly passed to the insurgents, comprising mainly the intellectuals, the youth, the army and the striking workers. The peasants themselves took little active part in the Revolt. It was soon evident, however, that Hungary could not be won or lost without the tacit consent of the peasants, and that any future government would have to seek their support. On October 30, when the Revolt seemed to have succeeded and the Russian troops had partly withdrawn, the Nagy government announced that compulsory crop deliveries would be discontinued as of that day. This change of policy has not yet been rescinded by the Kadar regime. At the same time various pronouncements and lists of demands were being published by revolutionary groups. On October 31 Radio Miskolc broadcast a statement from the Borsod Workers' Council which called for the dissolution of collective farms which were not economically self-supporting or whose members wished to dissolve them. Small peasant farms were to be established from the land of the liquidated collectives. Machine Tractor Stations were to be transformed into "associations for the use of machines and into machine repair stations."

On November 1 the revolutionary paper *Paraszt Függetlenség* [Peasant Independence] published a list of nine demands on behalf of the "Hungarian agrarian population." The basic demands were as follows:

"1. Complete rejection . . . of Stalinist peasant policy. A decree must be issued ordering the dissolution of weak [agricultural] collectives and collectives established by means of violence. Peasants must be granted the right to leave the collectives. . . . The land, property and animals which they brought to the collectives must be returned to them and they must be given State support. The present system of State assistance to collectives must be discontinued. State support must be administered by a collective center . . . elected by collective members.

"3. The present setup of the Machine Tractor Stations must be discontinued. . . .

"4. Far-reaching financial assistance must be granted to independent peasants.

"5. We approve the discontinuation of the compulsory delivery system . . . but this is only a first step. The extremely high peasant taxes must be reduced immediately and the present system of taxation must be revised. . . .

"6. The old system of selling and purchasing land must be restored.

"7. State farms whose output and profits are inadequate must be liquidated."

While the peasants' political leaders were framing conditions for a new regime, the countryside was taking matters into its own hands. The peasants of the collectives did not wait for permission to leave them; as soon as the restraining hand of the local authorities was lifted they began to break up the collectives on a scale that exceeded



The Felsobabab State Farm. It is described as a "cattle ranch, but it has an orchard and vineyard as well." The facade is part of an old estate.

Hungary (Budapest), No. 12, 1955

the great exodus of 1953. The dissolutions went on long after the open fighting in the towns had ended, and the Kadar regime was not able to reverse the tide until the end of January 1957. At the height of it, more than 60 percent of the collective farms dissolved, or 3,037 out of a pre-Revolt total of 5,011 (Radio Budapest, May 25). The collapse was greatest in the Transdanubian area, where 75 percent of the collectives were lost. In Somogy county the proportion reached 89 percent and in Baranya 82 percent, according to the January issue of *Statisztikai Közlemények* (Budapest). In Vas county 165 collectives dissolved out of 215 (*Nepszabadság* [Budapest], January 29). The members of the disintegrating collectives divided

the property among them, taking the machinery and the livestock.

Kadar's Policies

The Kadar regime, which had assumed the title of "The Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government," was forced to maneuver as best it could in a situation beyond its control. Its initial 15-point program published on November 4 called for the "development of agricultural production, the abolition of compulsory deliveries, and assistance to individual farmers. The government will firmly liquidate all illegalities committed in the field of agricultural collectives and the commassation of land." At the same time it issued appeals to the peasants to "defend" their collective farms. A typical broadcast from the Budapest radio on November 4 went as follows:

"The counterrevolutionary bandits want to get back everything—the factories, the land—which the people rightly took into their possession. . . . In the November 3 issue of *Szolnokmegyei Néplap* [People's Newspaper of Szolnok County—a revolutionary paper] an article openly states that present farming must, in accordance with the conditions prevailing after the land reform, be based on the inviolability of private property, that security of peasant farming must be created. . . . In other words, back to the 1945 land reform: that is, security for owners of 100 or 200 hold [1 hold equals 1.42 acres]. . . . For the time being they would have been satisfied with this. . . . The next step would have been the restoration of estates of 1,000 and 10,000 hold and [the restoration] of the exploiting rule of the Baghys and Esterhazys, the counts and gentry and squires.

"Collective farm members, individual farmers! Take a firm stand against all such attempts to 'tidy up' your land, in plain language, to rob it! Working peasants! Defend the collective farms, defend your land. . . . Hands off the collective farms, the State farms, and the lands of the individual farmers!"

But the exodus from the collectives continued, and the best the regime could do was to attempt to regulate it. "[The government] appeals to the leaders and members of collective farms, machine stations and State farms to do everything in their power to prevent plunder or destruction of collective farm or State property. . . . Quitting members may take along with them only what is specified by a membership meeting (*Nepszabadsag*, December 2). As weeks went by, and the Revolt became a thing of the past, the official attitude stiffened. The regime declared more and more emphatically that the future of agriculture lay in collective farming, and an effort was made to recoup some of the losses of the Revolt. By April the number of collective farms had risen again to 3,410 from a low of 1,974 (Radio Budapest, May 25). As compared with its status before October, the collective sector had lost about 32 percent of its farms, 46 percent of its land, 55 percent of its members and 75 percent of its livestock. The loss was more severe than that of 1953, when the collective sector lost about 41 percent of its members and only 12 percent of its farms.

Collectivization in Hungary

	Number of Collectives	Number of Households	Number of Members
Jan. 1949	380	—	10,000
Dec. 1949	1,520	—	46,000
Oct. 1950	2,500	—	140,000
Dec. 1950	2,185	76,887	119,527
Feb. 1951	2,807	—	160,000
Dec. 1951	4,652	—	350,000
Dec. 1952	5,315	—	446,900
Dec. 1953	4,677	—	263,070
Dec. 1954	4,500	200,000	—
Types I and II* . . .	1,000	—	—
Type III	3,500	—	—
Dec. 1954	4,381	186,681	229,952
Sept. 1955	4,600	—	—
Types I and II . . .	1,224	—	—
Type III	3,376	—	—
Dec. 1955	4,816	244,953	305,501
Sept. 1956 Type III .	3,907	228,216	292,901
Oct. 1956	4,911	—	—
Types I and II . . .	957	—	—
Type III	3,954	—	—
Dec. 1956 Type III .	1,719	118,216	148,501
Dec. 1956	1,926	—	—
Types I and II . . .	457	—	—
Type III	1,469	—	—
March 1957	3,333	—	158,469
Types I and II . . .	851	—	36,069
Type III	2,482	—	122,400
April 1957 Type III .	2,439	—	123,600
May 1957	3,400	—	161,095

* There are three types of collective farm in Hungary. Type III, which corresponds to the Russian *kolkhoz*, is the one favored by the Communists. Types I and II are of a "lower" order, in that the members retain certain rights of private ownership in the land they contribute. However, new by-laws published in July 1955 stipulated that all land would be held in common except for the household plots, thus diminishing the differences.

Sources: Jan. 1949: *Statistikai Szemle* (Budapest), various numbers, 1949; Dec. 1949: *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), Oct. 27, 1950; Oct. 1950: *ibid.*; Dec. 1950: *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkönyv* 1956; Feb. 1951: *Szabad Nep*, Feb. 26, 1951; Dec. 1951: *Szabad Nep*, Dec. 2, 1951; Dec. 1952: *Szabad Nep*, Dec. 16, 1952; Dec. 1953: Radio Budapest, Dec. 29, 1953; Dec. 1954: *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Budapest), Dec. 1954, and *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkönyv* 1956; Sept. 1955: *Szabad Nep*, Sept. 19, 1955; Dec. 1955: *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkönyv* 1956; Sept. 1956: *Statistikai Kozlemenyek* (Budapest), Jan. 1957; Oct. 1956: *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), April 10, 1957; Dec. 1956: *Statistikai Kozlemenyek*, Jan. 1957, and *Nepszabadsag*, April 10, 1957; March 1957: *Nepszabadsag*, April 10, 1957; April 1957: Radio Budapest, April 11, 1957; May 1957: Radio Budapest, May 20, 1957, and May 25, 1957. (Conflicting Dec. 1956 Type III figures stem from conflicting sources.)

Faced with a bankrupt and inflationary economy, the Kadar government was slow in arriving at a long-term policy for agriculture. However, an unofficial preview was given on May 20 in a lecture by Lajos Feher, member of the Party Central Committee. According to a summary broadcast by Radio Budapest on that date, Feher attacked both the "sectarian mistakes" of the Rakosi period and

the "right-wing deviations" of Imre Nagy. He said the Party had failed to win over the majority of the small and medium peasantry because of its excessive reliance on force. Moreover, the burden of compulsory deliveries had been so high that it had destroyed incentives for increasing production. On the other hand, Imre Nagy had been seriously at fault in arguing that the postwar land reform had eliminated the danger of capitalism in the countryside. Feher charged that Nagy's supporters, who had so sharply criticized the mistakes of past years during the public discussions in the summer and fall of 1956, had really been aiming to liquidate the collective farms. He emphasized that the Party had not given up its goal of Socializing agriculture, but that it must seek to avoid the mistakes of the past. Particularly important was the fact that one-third of Hungary's arable land and nearly half of its private farms belonged to approximately 300,000 "medium peasants"—i.e., those owning more than four hectares of land—and it would be impossible to collectivize agriculture without the acquiescence of this important segment.

In the meantime the peasant seemed to be ahead. In place of the former system of compulsory deliveries the Kadar government had instituted a system of purchasing on State account. Prices paid farmers for commodities bought under this system were several times higher than the old compulsory delivery prices, though not as high as free market prices. This gain was offset to some extent by the reimposition of a land tax, to be paid in wheat or some other grain, by a steep rise in farmers' income tax rates, and by higher prices for the services of machine stations. A United Nations study estimates that in 1957 farm incomes "will probably surpass last year's level by not more than around 2 billion *forint*"—which would indicate an overall gain in real income of probably not more than 10 percent. (See the UN's *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, May 1957, p. 77 and Table 20 on p. 83.)

On August 1 the Party issued a set of "theses" outlining its program for agriculture. Nothing in the theses was radically new. They showed that the Kadar regime was determined to grasp both horns of its dilemma at once and to push collectivization while at the same time trying to raise agricultural production. In this respect the policy was identical with that of the Second Five Year Plan published more than a year before, though it refrained from setting specific goals. The theses conceded that the independent peasants would accept collectivization only after "a radical change" in their mentality, and that such a change could be induced only by showing them "clearly and tangibly" that collective farms are superior to small private farms. To this end the State was to subsidize the collectives and the State farms to the limits of its capacity so as to develop them "as soon as possible into modern intensive farms capable of setting an example."

Analyzing the social structure of the countryside, the theses made a number of interesting observations. The peasants in collective farms formed "the kernel of the monolithic peasant class of the future," but "in many cases contradictions are still noticeable between the Socialist economic position and the class consciousness of the mem-



"It is difficult to do justice in the land issue." Picture shows "working peasant" Lajos Szabo calling on the agricultural expert of his town council. His four hectares of land now belong to a collective farm, and he wants them back. "Now they are willing to compensate him from the State reserve land."

Jovendonk (Budapest), March 1, 1957

bers." A more reliable group were the one million agricultural workers and semi-proletarians—i.e., hired workers on State farms, in tractor stations and in forestry, who form "the largest single stratum of the villages." During the October Revolt this group "took essentially a firm stand behind the People's Democracy." A third group were the more than 250,000 smallholders, owning from three to eight cadastral holds [1.71 to 4.56 hectares] of land. The Party must "make palpably clear to them that their future is anchored not in the economic forms of medium peasantry but in well-paying, cooperative, large scale cultivation [i.e., collective farms] with which the farms of medium peasants are incapable of competing." The fourth group, the medium peasants, "form the most well-to-do stratum of the working peasantry." Because compulsory deliveries have been abolished and higher prices are now paid for their produce by the government, this stratum feels that "it has gained strength in its individual landholdings and it is endeavoring to perpetuate this process." The regime promised to keep their "capitalist tendencies" in check by limiting their holdings to 20 to 25 cadastral holds [11.4 to 14.25 hectares]. Because of their "excessively individualistic frame of mind," they were to be pushed slowly toward collectivization by means of simpler forms of association like those introduced in 1955 (see above, p. 18). The fifth peasant stratum was of course the "village exploiters" or "kulaks." The Party would not employ against them "the 'liquidating'

methods that were customary in the last few years" but would seek instead to limit their political influence.

The policy emerging from this "class analysis" was essentially the one the Communists had employed in previous years: "In the next few years, in the fight for the development and Socialist transformation of agriculture, we must do all in our power to win over most of the peasantry—the small and medium peasants—while placing reliance on the forces and political position of the agricultural workers, semi-proletarians and members of collective farms." But nowhere in the analysis did the Party claim any positive support among the peasantry. The "class consciousness" of the collective farm members was admittedly inadequate. The medium peasants were "excessively individualistic." Even the hired workers and semi-proletarians had supported the regime only "essentially"—presumably not wholly. Admissions like these made it clear that the theses were not so much a political program as a prescription drawn reluctantly to Soviet order.

A hint of the embarrassment that many Party members

feel in their relation to the peasantry was to be seen in a series of articles written by Erno Urban, the regime's publicist for collective farms. In the January 13 issue of *Nepszabadsag* he described an instance of the way in which the Rakosi regime had forced peasants into collectives by the threat of physical violence at the hands of the security police (AVH). In another article on February 17, devoted to a collective farm in Vas County, he described the peasants' resentment at the secret police, the agricultural bureaucracy and the illegal acts of the Rakosi period. The Party secretary of the collective farm asked the writer to transmit "a message to the leaders of the country about Soviet methods." The message was conveyed in a metaphor that has lately become very common in Eastern Europe. "If in the future they import an overcoat from Moscow and it doesn't fit properly—let us say the sleeves are too short—they ought not to try to make it fit by twisting our hands as they did in the past. It would be a much better idea if, instead of chopping off our fingers, they would let down the sleeves of the coat."

Cash is Safest

OLD ION came from the countryside to Bucharest and opened a little hardware store. But times are difficult, there are no goods to sell and people have no money to buy, and he closed the shop. As soon as the militiamen noticed that a licensed store was closed without permission they clamped a 500 lei fine on old Ion. While they were inspecting the store they noticed a few geese in the corner.

"What are these geese doing here?" the head militiaman asked.

"Nothing much," old Ion said. "They're my geese."

"What do they eat?"

"Oh, I give them a little corn."

"What?" roared the militiaman, "Don't you know it is forbidden to feed corn to poultry?" Which meant another 500 lei fine for utilizing corn in an unlawful and anti-Socialist manner.

A week passed, still there was nothing to sell and no one to buy, and the store remained closed. Again the militiamen came, and there was another 500 lei fine. The geese were still in the corner, and the head militiaman said, "What do you feed the geese with now?"

"Oh," said old Ion, "I give them a little wheat."


"Wheat!" bellowed the militiaman. "Don't you know that you are depriving the citizens of our People's Democracy of invaluable foodstuffs?" Another 500 lei fine.

Another week passed, the store remained closed, and the militiamen came again for their weekly 500 lei. The geese were still in the corner.

"Well, old man, what do you feed your geese now?"

Ion shrugged. "I do not feed them," he said. "I give them the money and they buy their own food."

Eyewitness



Reports...

This section presents current information on conditions in East Europe from refugees and others interviewed by the Free Europe Committee.

The impact of the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary on students in the Soviet Union was described by a young Hungarian who was studying in Moscow at the time. He was one of seventeen Hungarians who, together with groups of the same size from the other "People's Democracies," as well as the Russian student body, were attending the Institute of International Relations, the Kremlin's foreign service school. (An estimated 1500 students from Hungary study in the Soviet Union at various universities and institutes of higher education. They are selected on the basis of class background, presumed political reliability and leadership potential.)

The student explained how and what the East European students learned of the October events in Poland and Hungary. The Polish students knew everything that had occurred in Poland almost immediately, not only about the Eighth Plenum and the Soviet leaders' visit, but also about troop movements and the activity of the armed factory workers. Their source of information was believed to be mainly the Western radio, which was heavily jammed but intelligible. How they knew the information was accurate and understood its meaning required a more complex explanation:

To this Hungarian student, as to the other students who went back to their own countries for vacation in the summer of 1956, it was clear that there were great changes in progress in Poland and Hungary. When in Budapest in June, this student had attended the historic meeting of the Petofi Club at which the writer Tibor Dery spoke.

The difference in outlook between the Polish and Hungarian students and the Russian students was brought into sharp focus when they returned to classes in Moscow in the autumn. The Russian students were oblivious of the changes in East Europe, and it seemed that the Soviets in general, including the leaders, were quite unable to grasp what was happening. According to the Hungarian student, the Russian students' thinking is bounded by the methods and categories of political analysis which have prevailed in the Soviet Union for nearly 40 years. The idea of dif-

ferent kinds of Socialism is unknown; there is only one "Socialism": Soviet Communism. They continue to view capitalism as a fixed structure incapable of modification or development. In short, it is impossible for them to grasp notions of diverse, developing, evolving socio-economic and political systems. They were therefore quite unable to make intellectual contact with the ideas which the 20th Soviet Party Congress stirred up in East Europe. The Russian students, in the autumn of 1956, were still thinking along the old lines, while the Polish and Hungarian students were thinking in a new way, having some memory and experience of the various ideas of Socialism represented by the Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and other European Socialist parties, and also some conception of the realities in capitalist Western Europe.

The rift among the students in Moscow widened and he and his Hungarian and Polish friends felt more and more mentally isolated from the Russians. To illustrate the trend of his group's thinking even before the actual uprising in Hungary, he described how, at the time of Rajk's rehabilitation, in early October, they made up a wall newspaper, black-bordered, which referred to Rajk, Bela Kun and others, and indirectly condemned not only the past Stalin era but the continuation of certain of its features in the Soviet Union at present.

The revolt in Hungary also caused differences of opinion among the Hungarian students themselves. Some realized it was a genuine popular revolution; others thought it was, as the Soviet newspapers claimed, a Fascist counter-revolution. The difference of opinion was over what was actually happening, not over whether a Socialist-oriented revolution was desirable. The students were unanimous in their desire to get home immediately.

Out of his complete lack of faith in the Soviet press (he cited as an example how in 1953 it had represented Nehru as just another enemy of the people and in 1955 praised him as the great Asian friend of Socialism) and his own knowledge of the situation at home, this Hungarian student was certain that the revolution was real.

Hungary, he said, had in 1953 been very close to revolution. Only the New Course and the shift to Nagy has forestalled it, because people—the plain a-political people—“had had all they could stand.” After the war, such people had simply wanted a chance to make their own way. The peasants (whom the student knew best because he had lived in a village) wanted to farm peacefully, have enough to eat, and perhaps get a little ahead; the majority were quite unconcerned with Party and government affairs. Then the Communists came to power. For the peasant, this meant not only collectivization, but all sorts of problems—if he could not pay his taxes, which were very high, or didn't subscribe to the government loan, he might be arrested as a kulak, or for something else, and his property confiscated. For the ordinary people daily life under Communism meant working harder and harder for less and less, with the constant anxiety of saying or doing something displeasing to the authorities and losing their livelihood or going to jail.

The New Course not only brought considerable material relief to the people but also a glimpse of some other countries. For instance, journalists visiting Yugoslavia reported on the number of foreign tourists and businessmen traveling there and how many Western films could be seen. To the average Hungarian these things were impressive, and they began to resent their own constraints. When Rakosi returned to power, a liberal Party opposition also came into existence. The climate of demand received further encouragement by what news got through from Poland—for instance the right of interpellation [questioning from the floor] of ministers in the Polish Parliament had great appeal.

When news of “unrest” in Hungary was released in Moscow, this student knew that it was a revolution. He believes that, had it succeeded, there would have been a new sort of Socialist state, different from Western and Eastern “Socialism” alike. But also he believed at the time that the Soviet Union would not tolerate such a development in East Europe, and was not surprised, though grieved, when the tone of the Soviet press statements about the new Nagy regime turned hostile and military intervention followed shortly after.

All during the revolution—from October 23 into November—the Hungarian students in Moscow had been trying to go home. They applied first to the Hungarian Embassy, which refused to get them transport; they tried the Polish Embassy, which also declined to help; and they were unable to gain access to the American Embassy. So they kept “plaguing” the Hungarian Ambassador who, as a Rakosi man, continued to refuse to arrange for them to leave. They went to the Embassy every day and threatened to stage a sitdown strike. Meanwhile, the Institute director called them in to urge them to attend classes as usual, stop listening to the foreign radio and rely on *Pravda* which was, he said, an “authoritative newspaper.” He urged them “as a friend” to remain, pointing out that if they left they could probably never come back. Eventually, this student gave up trying to get home through channels, sold all his possessions to raise the money, and bought a ticket for Hungary. His passport was in order and no visa for travel between Hungary and the Soviet Union was required. He arrived in Budapest toward the end of November, realized that the revolution had been completely crushed, and after several weeks escaped to Austria.

Premature History

A joke circulating in Prague:

At the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, a certain delegate from Kazakhstan fell asleep during the reading of a long report. He was still asleep when Khrushchev arose to speak. Just after Khrushchev had launched into his attack on Stalin, and was denouncing the old dictator for all the bestialities of the past, the speech was interrupted by the comrade from Kazakhstan. In his sleep he cried out, “Khrushchev is a liar, Khrushchev is a liar and a traitor and a monster.” A terrified silence fell on the Congress hall. The delegate sitting next to the comrade from Kazakhstan jabbed him in the ribs, waking him, and hissed in his ear, “What are you saying? Don't you know you're at the Twentieth Party Congress?”

The comrade from Kazakhstan, looking confused, said, “I'm sorry, I must have dozed off. I was dreaming I was at the Twenty-First Congress.”

Milovan Djilas:

"The New Class"

EXTRACTS CORROBORATED BY COMMUNIST SOURCES

"*The New Class*" by Milovan Djilas (New York: Frederick A. Praeger; July 1957; \$3.95) is a remarkable document, probably the first full-scale analysis and criticism of the reality of Communist society written by a man who was for years a leader of that society. On September 5, 1957, Djilas, former comrade-in-arms of Yugoslav Marshall Tito, former President of the Yugoslav National Assembly, was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for "seeking to undermine the people's authority, defense and economic powers" by the publication of his book abroad (Djilas had already served one year of a three year sentence imposed for other publications abroad). As a reasoned and thorough examination of Communism in practice, "*The New Class*" should be read by everyone interested in the realities of that practice. As a matter of fact, many of the most damaging points made by Djilas have also been made by the Communists themselves in the ferment of criticism and self-criticism that has swept the area in the last two years. We here present some of those criticisms from Communist sources, together with the same points made by Djilas; the Communist sources are printed in italics.

Use of Terror

IN EARLIER REVOLUTIONS, revolutionary force and violence became a hindrance to the economy as soon as the old order was overthrown. In Communist revolutions, force and violence are a condition for further development and even progress. In the words of earlier revolutionaries, force and violence were only a necessary evil and a means to an end. In the words of Communists, force and violence are elevated to the lofty position of a cult and an ultimate goal."

* * *

"In earlier revolutions, including the Reign of Terror in France, superficial attention was paid to the elimination of real oppositionists. No attention was paid to the elimination of those who might become oppositionists. The eradication and persecution of some social and ideological groups in the religious wars of the Middle Ages was the only exception to this. From theory and practice, Communists know that they are in conflict with all other classes and ideologies, and behave accordingly. They are fighting against not only actual but also potential opposition. In the Baltic countries, thousands of peo-

ple were liquidated overnight on the basis of documents indicating previously held ideological and political views. The massacre of several thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forest was of similar character. In the case of Communism, long after the revolution is over, terrorists and oppressive methods continue to be used. Sometimes these are perfected and become more extensive than in the revolution, as in the case of the liquidation of the kulaks."

"It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression by the government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites—long politically defeated by the Party, and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those Party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who had actively fought against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist Party line.

"Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people.' This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression. . . . In the main and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the 'confession' of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probings proved, 'confessions were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. . . ."

"Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation." (Nikita Khrushchev in his closed-session speech at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, February 1956.)

Economic Disproportions

"... The concentration of all means to achieve a specific purpose make it possible for the power-wielders to progress with extraordinary speed in certain branches of the economy. The progress that the U.S.S.R. has achieved in some branches has heretofore never been achieved anywhere in the world. However, when one considers the backward conditions existing in other branches the progress achieved is not justified from the over-all economic point of view."

"In carrying out the Six Year Plan [1950-1955] a maximum of investment was concentrated in certain selected sectors, and other fields of economic life were not taken into consideration. And yet, the national economy constitutes an integral whole; it is impossible to favor certain branches of the economy excessively at the expense of others, for the loss of proper balance causes harm to the economy as a whole. Particular concern should be aroused by the housing problem in the countryside. . . . On the assumption that the average life of a building—considering its postwar condition—is 50 years, we should have built 150,000 rooms in the countryside every year in order to maintain

the number of rooms existing in 1950. This amounts to about 900,000 rooms for the Six Year Plan, while only some 370,000 were built. . . . The position is not much better in the field of public services, health resorts or sanatoria. . . . The result of our former practice of planning and management is that we did not carry out on schedule the projected tasks in the privileged sector [of the economy], that we froze and wasted tremendous resources there, and that we did not create conditions for the liquidation of the economic backwardness in those sectors which had already been deliberately restricted." (Wladyslaw Gomulka to the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Party, October 20, 1956, as reported by official Polish press service, October 21.)


Promise and Reality

"Although the Communist revolution may start with the most idealistic concepts, calling for wonderful heroism and gigantic effort, it sows the greatest and the most permanent illusions."

* * *

"Everything happened differently in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries from what the leaders—even such prominent ones as Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin—anticipated. They expected that the state would rapidly wither away, that democracy would be strengthened. The reverse happened. They expected a rapid improvement in the standard of living—there has been scarcely any change in this respect and, in the subjugated East European countries, the standard has even declined. In every instance, the standard of living has failed to rise in proportion to the rate of industrialization, which was more rapid. It was believed that the differences between cities and villages, between intellectual and physical labor, would slowly disappear; instead these differences have increased. Communist anticipation in other areas—including their expectations for developments in the non-Communist world—have also failed to materialize."

*"From villages and little towns they come in carts
to build a foundry and dream out a city,
dig out of the earth a new Eldorado.
with an army of pioneers, a gathered crowd,*



"How did he rise so high?"

Szpilki (Warsaw), September 22, 1957

*they jam in barns, barracks and
hostels,
walk heavily and whistle loudly in
the muddy streets:
the great migration, the twisted ambi-
tion,
with a string on their necks—the
Czestochowa cross,
three floors of swear-words, a feather
pillow,
a gallon of vodka and the lust for*

*girls.
Distrustful soul, torn out of the vil-
lage soil,
half-awakened and already half-mad,
in words silent, but singing, singing
songs,
the huge mob, pushed suddenly
out of medieval darkness: un-human
Poland,
howling with boredom on December
nights. . . .*

*In garbage baskets and on hanging ropes
boys fly like cats on night walls,
girls' hostels, the secular nunneries,
burst with rutting—and then the
"Duchesses"
ditch the foetus—the Vistula flows
here. . . .
The great migration building in-
dustry,
unknown to Poland, but known to
history,
fed with big empty words, and living
wildly from day to day despite the
preachers,
in coal gas and in slow, continuous
suffering
the working class is shaped out of it.
There is a lot of refuse. So far there
are grits." (From Adam Wazyk's
"A Poem for Adults," Nowa Kultura
[Warsaw], August 21, 1955.)*

Intellectual Repression

"Even in Communist systems, men are not so stupified by uniform propaganda that it is impossible for them to arrive at the truth or at new ideas. In the intellectual field, however, the plan of the oligarchs results less in production than in stagnation, corruption, and decay.

"These oligarchs and soul-savers, these vigilant protectors who see to it that human thought does not drift into 'criminal thought' or 'anti-socialist lines'; these unscrupulous procurers of the cheap and actually the only available consumer goods—these holders of obsolete, unchangeable, and immutable ideas—have retarded and frozen the intellectual impulses of their people. They have thought up the most antihuman works—'pluck from the human consciousness'—and act according to these words, just as if they were dealing with roots and weeds instead of man's thoughts."

* * *

"Neither in the U.S.S.R. nor in other Communist countries does the existence of censorship absolve creating artists from self-censorship. Intellectuals are forced into self-censorship by their status and the reality of social relations. Self-censorship is actually the main form of party ideological control in the Communist system."

* * *

"An enemy to thought in the name of science, an enemy to freedom in the name of democracy, the Communist oligarchy cannot but accomplish complete corruption of the mind."

"... Suicide, despair, alcoholism, and debauchery, the loss of internal powers and integrity because the artist is forced to lie to himself and others—these are the most frequent phenomena in the Communist system among those who actually wish to, and could create."

"It was most important for me to express my own judgements [in writing] about literature. . . . I found it repulsive to write half-truths; I was fed up with reviews in which authors wrote about everything but what they themselves thought. The writer is paralyzed when he knows that every word he writes will be scrutinized in the light and looked over carefully according to the one decisive criterion—whether or not he has exposed himself." (Jan Kott, *Nowa Kultura* [Warsaw], March 6, 1955.)

The New Class

"The emergence of the new class has been concealed under socialist phraseology and, more important, under the new collective forms of property ownership. The so-called socialist ownership is a disguise for the real ownership by the political bureaucracy."

* * *

"Because of its totalitarianism and monopolism, the new class finds itself unavoidably at war with everything which it does not administer or handle, and must deliberately aspire to destroy or conquer it."

* * *

"Contemporary Communism is not only a party of a certain type, or a bureaucracy which has sprung from monopolistic ownership and excessive state interference in the economy. More than anything else, the essential aspect of contemporary Communism is the new class of owners and exploiters."

* * *

"The fact that there is a new owning monopolistic, and totalitarian class in Communist countries calls for the following conclusion: All changes initiated by the Communist chiefs are dictated first of all by the interests and aspirations of the new class, which, like every social group, lives and reacts, defends itself and advances, with the aim of increasing its power."

"They say, for instance, that during the occupation there were Meisl

*shops [shops reserved exclusively for Germans]. And today the shops behind the golden drapes are commonly called Meisl shops. . . . There is a variety of these consumer shops. There are consumer shops for regular employees of the Security apparatus, Militia, Army or lower echelon of employees of the Party apparatus. There are consumer shops which are patronized by officers up to the rank of Colonel or General, and there are also separate shops for the military higher-ups and Ministers. It can be concluded from this that even among these privileged segments of society there is no equality." (From the now-abolished weekly *Poprostu* [Warsaw], April 1, 1957.)*

Limited Vision

"This is a class whose power over men is the most complete known to history. For this reason it is a class with very limited views, views which are false and unsafe. Closely ingrown, and in complete authority, the new class must unrealistically evaluate its own role and that of the people around it.

"Having achieved industrialization, the new class can now do nothing more than strengthen its brute force and pillage the people. It ceases to create. Its spiritual heritage is overtaken by darkness."

"We are seriously lagging behind in the study of the contemporary phase of capitalism. We are not studying facts and figures deeply enough, and frequently limit ourselves, for purposes of agitation, to picking out individual facts about the symptoms of an approaching crisis and the impoverishment of the workers, but fail to provide a well-rounded evaluation in depth of the happenings in life abroad. . . . Before the war we had an institute of world economy and world politics; yet this too was liquidated, and the Institute of Economics . . . does not and cannot cope with a serious study of the economy in the countries of Socialism and the countries of capitalism. There exists in the system of the Academy of Sciences another institute which studies the problems of the East. However, all that can be said is that while the whole East has awakened in our times, this institute happily dozes

away. . . ." (From Mikoyan's speech to the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, Radio Moscow, February 20, 1956.)

Not "Stalinism" But the System

"The world center of Communist ideology no longer exists; it is in the process of complete disintegration. The unity of the world Communist movement is incurably injured. There are no visible possibilities whatsoever that it can be restored. However, just as the shift from Stalin to 'collective leadership' did not alter the nature of the system itself in the U.S.S.R., so too national Communism has been unable, despite ever increasing possibilities for liberation from Moscow, to alter its internal nature, which consists of total control and monopoly of ideas, and ownership by the party bureaucracy."

* * *

"Unfortunately, new . . . myths are appearing. Now they say that responsibility for the past belongs to the cult of the individual. . . . Let us follow this formula to the end. First of all, [let us not refer] to the cult of the individual but to the individual himself. Further, it is not the individual, but the system which permits the individual to conduct such dangerous activities. Only a true democratization of public life, restoration of public opinion and the return . . . to rational and unfettered thought can save us from Caesarism." (Antoni Slonimski in *Przegląd Kulturalny* [Warsaw], April 5-11, 1956.)

Independence

"The Communist East European countries did not become satellites of the U.S.S.R. because they benefited from it, but because they were too weak to prevent it. As soon as they become stronger, or as soon as favorable conditions are created, a yearning for independence and for protection of 'their own people' from Soviet hegemony will rise among them."

"The mutual relations between the Parties and States of the Socialist camp do not and should not give any cause for complications. . . . These relations should be built on the principles of international working class solidarity, on mutual confidence and equality of rights, mutual granting of assistance, mutual, friendly criticism.

Within the framework of such relations each country should have full independence, and the rights of each nation to a sovereign government in an independent country should be fully and mutually respected. This is how it should be and I would say that this is how it is beginning to be." (Wladyslaw Gomułka, to the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee, of the Polish Party, October 20, 1956, as reported by the official Polish press service, October 21.)

War on the People

"Communist regimes are a form of latent civil war between the government and the people. The state is not merely

an instrument of tyranny; society as well as the executive bodies of the state machine is in continuous and lively opposition to the oligarchy, which aspires to reduce this opposition by naked force."

* * *

"Though history has no record of any other system so successful in checking its opposition as the Communist dictatorship, none ever has provoked such profound and far-reaching discontent."

* * *

"Labor cannot be free in a society where all material goods are monopolized by one group. . . . Speaking in the abstract, the labor force, taken as a whole, is a factor in total social production. The new ruling class with its material and political monopoly uses this factor almost to the same extent that it does other na-



"Ten administrators [for one worker]—a top performance."

Dikobraz (Prague), May 2, 1957

tional goods and elements of production and treats it the same way, disregarding the human factor."

"This phenomenon is the general dislike and even pure hatred felt by the young [miners] toward the mining industry authorities and the officials of the union. The ones I spoke to were generally able to explain this hatred. 'I'd take everybody in the palace [union headquarters] to the woods and shoot them' Why? 'Because they're the ones to blame for everything.' I was told that one of the reasons for it is the remarkably brutal and completely unfeeling attitude of the overseers towards the young workers. Cheating on wages is the order of the day. The same goes for brutal treatment. No one complains for fear of losing his job. I was told by an older miner (his son is studying for a mechanical engineering degree) that in spite of the fact that the medical commission allowed him the right to work only a seven-hour day, his foreman did not permit him to leave the mine ahead of the regular time, but made him wait by

the elevator shaft, all wet and exhausted, for an hour and a half. 'Why don't you complain to the Party? You're a member. It's your duty.' 'Sure, they would take care of it,' he said, 'they'd fix everything—and then later they'd finish me off completely, and I have to make some money, my son is studying for a degree.' (Przegląd Kulturalny [Warsaw], August 22-28, 1957.)

Unemployment

"The great boast that there is full employment in Communist systems cannot hide the wounds which become evident as one looks more closely. As soon as all material goods are controlled by one body, these goods, like manpower needs, must become the subject of planning. Political necessities play an important role in planning and this unavoidably results in the retention of a number of branches of industry, which survive at the expense of others. Thus planning hides actual unemployment."

"I think everyone in Poland agrees in principle as to the waste and un-

deremployment of labor power in practically every branch of the national economy. . . . Opinions differ only as to the extent of the phenomenon and the ways and means of liquidating it." (Trybuna Ludu [Warsaw], August 6, 1956.)

Conformity

"History will pardon the Communists for much, establishing that they were forced into many brutal acts because of circumstances and the need to defend their existence. But the stifling of every divergent thought, the exclusive monopoly over thinking for the purpose of defending their personal interests, will nail the Communists to a cross of shame in history."

"I have a good friend whose husband is a social activist. Naturally most of his time is spent at meetings. His wife no longer asks him when he comes home what the discussion was about. She invariably heard the answer: 'Nothing new, the decisions were enforced from above.'" (Radio Warsaw, February 29, 1956.)



OJCOWIE

Fathers—Inscription on door: "Special Shop."



DZIECI

Sons—Inscription on door: "Special Kindergarten."

Szpilki (Warsaw), May 6, 1956

Czechoslovak Poets Speak

Although literary and intellectual ferment in Communist Czechoslovakia never attained the scope and intensity of that in Poland or pre-Revolt Hungary, it had reached considerable force by the summer of 1956. The events of October, however, the Hungarian Revolt and the Polish upheaval, caused the regime to clamp down upon almost all expressions of real criticism, all deviations from Party-guided conformity. The one exception was, it appears, poetry. As these verses show, Czechoslovak poets, publishing in relatively small circulation periodicals, using indirect, symbolic, inferential language, continued to attack the bureaucracy, Soviet interference, the imposition of intellectual strait-jackets by the Party. Now, it seems, even this small voice of criticism may be stilled; the recent stress on Khrushchev's hard-line dicta to writers, and even earlier Czechoslovak regime statements, indicate that the pressure on Czechoslovak writers and intellectuals is to increase.

The Well

by Jan Skacel

The well dried out. Where we used to go
to drink on hot summer days,
Not a drop is now shed by the earth,
mysterious, moist.
In vain the battered cup stands on the stone.
How long will it last,
how long will it take
before dense rain falls on the dry country?
If it rained the whole night and the whole day,
and then another night,
a little stream, thinner than a finger,
surely would spring.
They say there are no dry wells.
A small green wreath crowns that broken place,
where a cow and a man
come ask in vain.
Yet in the heart of the land
as in every one of us,
the level rises,
the level of clean, subsurface water.

Nový Život (Prague), April 1957

A Fairy Tale

by František Nechvátal

From time immemorial, from time to time,
barbarians invade the country.
The people's temple is ravished by fratricide
and merchants haggle there.
The rulers are always infallible
and become tyrants.
Crime fornicates in their palaces
and a lie lounges in its own easy chairs.
They want to lull the people to a trance
and lead it as a ram is led.
But the people has its memory for wounds,
its tortured soul silent.
Flung into fetters by treason,
it will shake its head like a giant.

It will nourish its soul with word
and drink in the virgin forest.
Let their trumpeting mouthpieces squeal,
let lies and deceit gush from their mouths,
The people will rip itself back from disaster
and let freedom grow in glory.

Host do Domu (Brno), April 1957

Everybody's Looking Forward to the Spring

by Jan Skacel

Everybody's looking forward to the Spring,
for it to emerge like a bull from behind the fence.
The streetcar conductor and the flower woman
and even Comrade Secretary.
He in particular, he most of all, he
who daily must compose one speech to us.
He steps over to the window and says — "Spring is here,"
and takes off his coat.
And here he sits in shirt and suspenders
his gaze narrowed to blank paper.
He is squeezed by the edge of the desk. He thinks,
and hears a blackbird, hears a blackbird sing.
From the bottom of his heart he would like,
he would like to go away for a while
to the park among the flowers,
where the sun dimples the cheeks of little children,
where a little blue shovel lies in the sand.
From the bottom of his heart he would like to meet maybe
someone he knows
and shake hands,
press someone's hand,
and he can not. No, he has no time at all,
not as much as you could put beneath your little fingernail.
He writes: "To us, Comrades, nothing is impossible!"
A blackbird sings outside the window. No, only this
is impossible.
And I, naive, have a vision of Marx:
In an alley a little bee, fearless, small
as if for fun mazed into
a thick beard, into silver bush.

Nový Život (Prague), March 1957



Polish Party leader Gomulka, left, and Yugoslav Marshal Tito about to sign their mutual Declaration on September 16.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), September 22, 1957

Current Developments

Area

Reaction to Launching of Satellite

The successful launching of an earth satellite by the Soviet Union brought joyous comments from all the Communist bloc countries. Radio Budapest, October 6, called the event, "a great new triumph of Soviet technology and science." A day earlier Radio Bucharest said it "constitutes a new and irrefutable proof of the high level reached by science and technique in the Soviet Union," and Radio Sofia spoke of the "epoch-making achievement of Soviet science." Warsaw newspapers headlined the feat with: "The Greatest Victory in the Field of Peaceful Competition," "The Beginning of the Interplanetary Epoch," "Soviet

Success Astounds the World" (Radio Warsaw, October 7).

The Czechoslovak Party organ, *Rude Pravo*, on October 4, wrote that the launching of the satellite "was possible only because the victory of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism had placed a strong weapon in the hands of Soviet scientists . . . enabling them to use this one really scientific world concept in their every-day practical activities."

Communists Exploit Little Rock Incidents

Communist propaganda organs leaped gleefully to the attack during the Little Rock school segregation disturbances. The press and radio deluged the public with stories of armed conflict and discrimination, and there was no attempt to impart the news that desegregation has been effected in some Southern areas or that the Little Rock turmoil was not typical of the entire country. Only in Poland was there a semblance of sober reporting.

In Hungary, the regime-controlled press took its cue from the words of Party boss Kadar and tied the American racial troubles to the UN vote on censuring Hungary. On September 23, Radio Budapest stated that the UN delegates "are well aware that should it come to a discussion of the situation in Oman, Cyprus or Algiers, of the symptoms of the current Negro persecution in America, it is the imperialist circles who trample human rights un-

derfoot." *Nepszabadsag* on September 13 anticipated a "fiasco" if the Hungarian question were to be placed before the UN. The official Communist newspaper said that the press of all the world, including that of the West, had devoted far more space to Little Rock than to Hungary in recent days—all of which proved to the satisfaction of the journal's editors that the "Hungarian question simply does not exist."

The Czechoslovak Party organ, *Rude Pravo*, on September 27, contrasted the dispatch of the US Sixth Fleet to "the Arab coasts" with the "failure" to provide protection for Negro citizens in the United States "whose civil rights have been suppressed in the most brutal manner."

Radio Moscow on September 23, along with the obvious fulminations and exaggerations, had a superficial Marxist explanation of the affair:

"The actions of the racists in the United States now, as in the past, are meeting with support from all who benefit from discrimination against the colored population of the country. The representatives of these circles think in this way: 'As long as the Negroes cannot enjoy equal rights with white people, one can pay far less for their labor than is paid white workers.' This means that in order to preserve the huge profits obtained by exploiting the cheap labor of colored workers, it is necessary to exploit racialism."

A more considered, if not particularly friendly, account of the resolution of the Little Rock affair appeared in *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw) and was read over Radio Warsaw, September 30:

"The main reason for President Eisenhower's decision [to send Federal troops to Little Rock] appears to be concern for strengthening the prestige of the central authorities with regard to the traditional separatist sentiments of the South. Neither the Federal Government nor the President himself, nor the leading quarters of the Republican Party can afford to tolerate such disobedience of the central authorities as demonstrated by Governor Faubus."

Baltic Proposal

To Romanian Premier Chivu Stoica's September 10 call for a conference of "Socialist" and "non-Socialist" Balkan States (see pp. 55-56; also last issue, pp. 37-38) was added a new proposal by Polish Party chief Wladislaw Gomulka for agreements between the Baltic States, including the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries. The Polish move was presaged in general terms during the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee May 15-18, 1957, but not publicly enlarged upon until September 15, when the Warsaw daily *Zielony Sztandar* reported an interview between Gomulka and a Danish newsman. The announced purpose of the move would be "neutralization of the Baltic. . . to form on and around [that body of water] a region of peaceful and constructive coexistence between nations of various systems and various political beliefs."

While the Stoica proposal asked a definite yes or no to a meeting of the Balkan States, the Gomulka plan put no such immediate burden of decision on his prospective

respondents. Instead he advocated closer cultural, scientific and touristic ties with the Scandinavian countries, more trade agreements added to the already existing ones, and, perhaps most revealingly, he envisaged a time when the economies of Poland and Scandinavia "might in many instances supplement each other." Thus, while making no precise proposal of a meeting, as Stoica did, Gomulka made his plan more likely of at least partial fulfillment.

That the Polish leader's ideas went beyond the parochial, however, was shown by his denunciation of the "remilitarization" of West Germany, which he stated was a menace to peace in the entire Baltic area. The implication was that any close association of the "Socialist" and "non-Socialist" nations would be unfriendly to a NATO-allied German Federal Republic. However, a series of extensive preliminary arrangements could be made—possibly even the afore-mentioned partial integration of Scandinavian and Communist-bloc economies—which might of necessity at some future date make the "non-Socialist" States more susceptible to an alignment against West Germany.

The Gomulka proposal has certain immediate effects. First, it asserts Polish initiative in world affairs in a manner that would never have been possible in Stalinist days; second, it provides propaganda for the "peace" offensive; and third, it puts stress on the Western alliance by enlarging the possibility of another "neutralist" bloc. For Gomulka's own particular situation, the proposal also has certain value. It would provide his restive country with closer ties to non-Communist States, while still allowing it to follow a policy which, for the latter two of the above-noted three reasons, will profit the Soviet Union.

Balkan "Entente"

Meanwhile, enthusiasm for Stoica's call for a Balkan conference has been confined to the Satellite countries.



Among the tourists who were in Rome this summer was a girl called Katya, at right, niece of Soviet Party boss Nikita Khrushchev.

Photo from *Swiat i Polska* (Warsaw), September 12-18, 1957

In the Diplomatic World (Continued)

"ULAN BATOR, September 15, 1957—A government delegation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, headed by Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council Vukmanovic, arrived in Ulan Bator today.

The guests were met by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic Tsedenbal and other statesmen of the republic along with workers' representatives. Among those present were members of the diplomatic corps, including the USSR Ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic, Molotov."

(Radio Moscow, September 15)

Yugoslavia, which consented to the meeting on September 17, did so without encomiums, and a statement by Vice President Rankovic (reported by Reuters, October 9) appeared to doom the meeting. Rankovic stated that the conference would take place only if all six nations agreed to take part. Otherwise, he continued, "it would have no significance." Greece and Turkey, meanwhile, have not accepted the invitation. The refusal of the former country came on September 24; that of the latter is expected. Only Bulgaria and Albania gave Stoica's plan unqualified support (September 18). Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were loud in praise of the move, in spite of the fact that they were not directly involved.

The reluctance of Greece and Turkey to involve themselves with the Communist governments was not unexpected, especially in view of their ties with the West and their present mutual estrangement over Cyprus. Yugoslavia's lack of enthusiasm can be traced to its fear of finding itself in an association of Soviet-dominated countries which, by force of numbers, would probably control group decisions.

Commenting on the Stoica proposal (three weeks before the Rankovic statement), the Yugoslav newspaper *Politika* of September 19 called it "a welcome step in the right direction." Caution was expressed, however, in the conditional language of the editorial:

"*With good will*, [the proposal] would be a serious contribution to peace. . . . A meeting of the heads of the Balkan governments *might* be a *part* of the daily efforts toward Balkan rapprochement." (italics added)

Comment on Djilas' Trial

Satellite reaction to the trial and conviction of Milovan Djilas and to his book "The New Class" was marked by virulent attacks on the Yugoslav author, often couched in the vitriolic phraseology of the Stalinist era. Polish comment, however—although condemnatory—was somewhat milder in tone, as is shown by the following excerpts from *Polityka* (Warsaw), mouthpiece of Party leader Gomulka, September 25:

"One who reads these mournful 'theoretical' considera-

tions recollects similar books which have afforded a much better explanation for the growth of the bureaucratic class. Others, like Sartre, have put forth weightier arguments on the same subject, and the level of their knowledge of Communism combined with their correct theoretical perception was incomparably higher. In a certain sense Djilas is a victim of his own backwardness. . . .

"Even the most anti-Stalinist banalities, of which there are many in Djilas' book, are not sufficiently well-reasoned. Nor are his vague speculations on the three phases of Communism: revolutionary, dogmatic, and non-dogmatic. . . .

"At the present time the public demands either sensational items [about Stalinism] . . . or really serious studies on contemporary Communism. Djilas . . . is not at all up to this latter task. . . . A characteristic example of his inability to look objectively at the various processes taking place in the Communist movement is his hatred for that which he defines as 'national Yugoslav Communism,' and which in fact is any kind of Communism concerned with the question of national independence for the country in which it rules. . . .

"Regardless of whether the uproar which has ensued around Djilas's book lasts two weeks or two months, it would appear that the popularity of this mediocre work, founded on banalities, will certainly not be very long-lasting."

COMECON Meetings

Communist economic planners foregathered in Prague September 25-27 to discuss the coordination of national plans for the next 10 to 15 years (Radio Prague, September 28). The conference, held within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was attended by representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and the USSR. Each of these countries is now preparing a long-term "perspective plan" for the basic branches of its economy.

Another meeting was held in Moscow September 10-14 to discuss the exchange of electric power among member States of COMECON, as well as the utilization of Danube water power. Representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and the USSR took part, and observers were present from Yugoslavia and the Danube Commission. According to Radio Prague, September 16, the meeting resolved "that the member countries construct a number of long-distance electric lines of 220,000 volts for the purpose of extending the power grid linking a number of member States." Another resolution provided for the preparation of a project to utilize the water power of the Danube. Neither of these projects is essentially new. Similar plans were outlined in 1956 for the exchange of electricity and the construction of hydroelectric plants, but the October events in Poland and Hungary evidently forced their delay.

Traffic in Delegations

Attesting to the rising influence of Communist China in Eastern Europe was the recent departure to that country of delegations led by high-ranking figures from all parts of the area. The occasion was the celebration of the Eighth Anniversary, October 1, of the Chinese People's Republic.

Poland sent its Minister of Defense, General Marian Spychalski; Hungary was represented by Party boss Janos Kadar and Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan; Czechoslovakia dispatched two delegations, one under Prague Mayor Adolf Svoboda, the other headed by National Assembly Chairman Zdenek Fierlinger; Premier Anton Yugov led the Bulgarian group; and Romanian National Assembly Chairman Constantin Pirvulescu was in charge of the Romanian delegation; Peter Stambolic, the President of the Yugoslav People's Assembly headed another group; and Albania was represented by Politburo member Rita Marko, President of the National Assembly.

Closer relations with nations of the Middle East, especially Syria, were continued, as agricultural and Parliamentary delegations from the latter country reached Hungary, September 5 and 27. Syrian groups were in Bulgaria, September 8 and Czechoslovakia, September 10. Three days later the Egyptian Finance Minister arrived in Prague, from Budapest. Also in Czechoslovakia were a Mongolian delegation, September 12—it too had arrived from Hungary—a Japanese youth group, September 9, and representatives of both East and West Germany, France, Britain, the USA and all the Communist countries for the festival honoring Comenius, the 17th Century Czech educational reformer, September 23.

Yugoslavia opened trade negotiations in Sofia, September 20, and on October 8 welcomed Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov for an eight day visit to Belgrade. Western observers called the Marshal's welcome perfunctory and mechanical in comparison to the enthusiasm which had greeted Polish Communist Party chief Gomulka the previous month.

Poland

The Poprostu Riots

Profound dissatisfaction—already revealed by large sections of the working class in the wave of strikes which has swept over the country (see *East Europe*, September 1957, pp. 28-29; October 1957, page 49)—was indicated in another element of the population, the students, during the violence which followed the banning of the liberal student newspaper *Poprostu* on October 2. Street riots took place for five consecutive nights in Warsaw, beginning October 3. (In addition, disturbances amounting to riots were staged by youth in Cracow, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, October 10. Rioting was also reported unofficially among the youth of Lodz and other Polish cities.) On the first two nights, the demonstrators were mainly students, but the character of the rioters appeared to change on October 5, and the regime press description of "hooliganism"—falsely made from the beginning of the disturbances—was borne out over the last three days by western dispatches and by the fact that the students publicly disassociated themselves from the latter demonstrations. From one to two thousand people turned out for each of the riots. They were opposed by militia who used truncheons and tear gas to clear the streets. According to Radio Warsaw, October 7, "scores" of persons have been detained by the police, "and indict-

ments will be brought" against the leaders. The first trial, Radio Warsaw said on October 18, would be held in Warsaw on October 25.

As for the editors of *Poprostu*, 10 of them have been expelled from the Party, Radio Warsaw, October 16, announced. Five others were warned and reprimanded, one simply reprimanded, and "no Party consequences" were drawn in the case of one editor. Among those expelled was E. Lasota.

Soviet-Polish Debates

THE WARSAW LITERARY MAGAZINE, *Nowa Kultura*, September 1, carried further information on disputes between Poles and Soviets at the recent Moscow Youth Festival (see *East Europe*, October 1957, pp. 47-9). The author, K. T. Toeplitz, one of the Polish festival delegates, contrasted the atmosphere at this festival with that of its predecessor in Warsaw in 1955, since after the experiences of last Fall "the myth of unanimity had burst. Discussion was increasingly vehement. People increasingly fell back on their own reasoning. Conflicts made themselves increasingly more apparent."

Among other arguments, Toeplitz described a meeting with Sofronov, editor of the Soviet periodical *Ogonek*, who claimed that, in his opinion, it was always possible to determine what was useful and creative, what had a future, in contemporary art. Toeplitz disagreed, stating that such final judgments must be left for time and the future, and defended the principle of "one hundred flowers," i.e., of permitting a variety of schools and methods.

Toeplitz remarked to Sofronov on the fact that "Socialist realism" is embodied in the Statutes of the Soviet Writers' Union. When Sofronov protested that "Socialist realism" is really the method best suited to Soviet writers, Toeplitz agreed, but doubted the necessity of enshrining methods of art in Statutes. "I am afraid of resolutions in the sphere of art," Toeplitz said, "because behind resolutions there is administrative force, and behind administrative force there is everything that neither Sofronov nor myself care to remember."

During the debates between the Polish and Soviet writers, Toeplitz had, it seems, been the subject of attack by Soviet writer Alexei Surkov, because according to Surkov, Toeplitz denied the value of Soviet literature. "To be frank," Toeplitz said later, "I was myself disturbed by the fact that my adversaries denied literature the right to show the seamy side of life."

Toeplitz commented that a play by Meyerhold [Soviet writer liquidated in 1939] was now being produced, and that Meyerhold had been "rehabilitated." He added: "Nevertheless, I would prefer to see a new Soviet play on the tragedy of Meyerhold produced in the Mayakovsky Theater. As our colleague Tadeusz Drewnowski said during the debates . . . : 'Soviet literature will not regenerate itself unless it goes through that hell with open eyes.'"



poprostu

Nakład 150.000 egz.

W NUMERZE:

Wyniki Konkursu.
J. Ambroziewicz, E. Gonesarski — Polska-NRF.
K. Wolicki — Paryż miasto otwarte.
W. Godek — Fabryka władzy.
R. Turski — Ostatni bastion?
J. Chudziński — Trzy kroki na Odrę.

Nr 26 (440)

Warszawa, data 30.VI 1957 roku

Cena 2 zł

of the paper, who led it in its days of crusading glory preceding the assumption of power by Gomulka in October 1956. He "resigned" from his position last April, but remained on the newspaper's staff.

Photo of Lasota from *Prasa Polska* (Warsaw), February 1957

Poprostu Ban Foreshadowed

The proscription of *Poprostu* was no sudden event. The weekly, which had been in the forefront of the Polish ferment leading to Gomulka's assumption of power in October 1956, had subsequently continued its searching criticisms of Poland's Communist society, to the Gomulka regime's displeasure. Its editorial board had proved so intransigent to official protests that by April 1957 its editor-in-chief, Eligiusz Lasota, had been forced to resign and by early summer there was talk of banning the publication. Before this step was taken, however, a "cooling-off" period was arranged. *Poprostu* went "on vacation" for the months of July and August. No issue appeared during that period, nor during the month of September. The first number prepared for the latter month was turned back by official censors to be "toned down." The rewritten issue, however, was still too strongly critical to be circulated, and the following number—also banned—proved to be the last straw. *Poprostu* was permanently suppressed. The immediate result was rioting.

Although the riots never reached the proportions of those accompanying the Poznań "Bread and Freedom" demonstrations of June 28, 1956, they were of great importance, for they represented the violent disillusionment of the same intellectual circles which had helped so greatly in establishing the government of Władysław Gomulka. Their significance was also attested by the notable absence of anti-riot statements from workers at the Zeran and Kasprzak factories who, along with the students, provided the chief support for Gomulka during the events of October 1956. (There was a plenitude of such regime-decreed statements from other State enterprises.)

Undoubtedly the awareness of Soviet forces within and without the country acted as a brake on many who would otherwise have given direct support to the students. Another element in subduing response was *Poprostu's* outspoken agnosticism, which alienated Catholic circles. It is significant that Cardinal Wyszyński brought a quieting influence to bear upon a group of students whom he addressed in Holy Cross Church. "I can understand your yearning for freedom of speech," he told them, "but you

should respect what you already have." The Cardinal added, "You must remember that our country is in a difficult situation, but by working hard you will build a better future."

Gomulka Attacks Poprostu

It is ironical that Gomulka himself should have been the instigator in suppressing the journal for the very spirit of independence which, when turned against the Stalinists, had helped to make him the national leader. Gomulka's hostility to the policies of *Poprostu* was forcefully expressed in remarks made during a question-and-answer period after a speech to the Zeran Automobile Factory workers on September 21. He accused the paper of blackening the achievements of Communism, of taking the most pessimistic view of contemporary events in the country and of failure to follow the Party line.

Following the lead of the First Secretary, the Party and the press leaped to attack the student paper. The October 5 *Trybuna Ludu* said the publication's articles were "a complete negation of the 13-year achievements of the Polish People's Republic and an apology for the capitalist West." The Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee issued a denunciatory statement (Radio Warsaw, October 4) which said in part:

"The staff of *Poprostu*, including the Party members working on it, has for many months opposed the realization of decisions made by the chief Party authorities and has descended to a position of barren negation. It presented the political and economic realities of the country in a false light. It spread lack of faith in the reality of Socialist construction and voiced bourgeois ideas on many problems.

"During the whole of that period the office of press control had intervened in almost every issue of *Poprostu*, forbidding the publication of the most harmful articles. Despite this, many items remained in the weekly which did social and political harm. Despite many talks and reprimands by representatives of the Central Committee, not only had there been no improvement in the activities of the editorial staff of *Poprostu* and of the Party members of that staff, but there had even been deterioration.

"Taking all this into account, the Secretariat has de-

Experimentation with Ethics

THE FIRST PERIOD of experimentation with ethics in post-war Poland has almost reached completion. In the leading non-Catholic centers the well known thesis concerning 'the basis and the super-structure' was the starting point with regard to problems of individual and social ethics. According to this theory, ethical evil—for example, thefts, careerism, prostitution, alcoholism, cynicism, lack of idealism, worship of money and egotism—is the poisonous mushroom which feeds and develops on a large scale on bourgeois capitalist fertilizer. When this base is destroyed and another economic, social and progressive base is substituted, the ethical evil should disappear over a period of time. A new ethical reality would then appear which would be expressed by the new man, 'the real man,' as he has been called by Boris Polovoi [a Soviet critic].

"Along with the theory of the basis and super-structure there has been another implied assumption. This is the idea that human nature is good and that there is no inclination to evil in man. This contradicts the doctrine of original sin held by Catholic theologians.

"Does life bear out these assumptions? We have to say that it does not." (*Tygodnik Powszechny* [Warsaw], September 22, 1957.)

cided that the decision of the chief office of press control to suspend publication of *Poprostu* was correct. It recommends that the Central Committee of Party Control examine the problem of taking Party organizational steps in respect to Party members on the *Poprostu* editorial staff."

Poprostu-Polityka Controversy

One of the most significant indications of the fate in store for *Poprostu* was the controversy between the weekly and *Polityka*, the Warsaw publication generally considered most reflective of the views of the Gomulka regime. *Polityka* featured in almost every one of its Spring and early summer editions strong attacks on the student paper. Finally, on June 30, the last issue before its summer hiatus, *Poprostu* responded in an article written by its new editor-in-chief Ryszard Turski. *Polityka*, according to Turski, had as its "spécialité de la maison" a systematic and ruthless campaign against *Poprostu*. The rebuttal continued in this fashion:

"Very often the editors of *Polityka* devoted at least half their space and almost all of their subject material to our paper. What have we not been accused of by the journalists from *Polityka*? Absolutely nothing, except ordinary criminal acts."

The editor of the student paper then went on to accuse *Polityka* of acting always from "external positions." By this he meant that the regime-supporting journal stood aside from the contemporary struggle for liberalization of the country and against current abuses. *Polityka* was an "examiner . . . a watchman . . . a guardian" but it did not "truly serve the idea of Socialism." Furthermore, con-


tinued Turski, "*Polityka* involuntarily sides with the conservatives and either makes no essential contribution to, or—even worse—hamstrings the process of democratization."

Among *Polityka's* replies to the Turski article was the following, as quoted in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 16:

"The sole political criterion of our [*Poprostu*] critics is the attitude toward conflicts within the nation. They gladly overlook the conflicts between the people and their enemies. It is this which separates their attitude not only from that of *Polityka* but also from that dictated by the social conditions of our country and the political line of our Party. . . .

"Publications which conceive the essence of the October [1956] turning-point differently than the Party, distinctly belittle the danger threatening all of us from the anti-Socialist forces. Frequently, though involuntarily, they abet those forces by demagogic and unfair criticism of Party policy and the Party cadre, as well as by pessimism in assessing the situation in the country. . . .

"*Poprostu* is a journal which finds itself even more consistently in opposition to the Party's policy."



There has been a very notable increase in Polish press coverage of Yugoslav events, people and places, specially since the Gomulka-Tito talks in September. Shown here is the front cover of the popular Warsaw picture weekly, *Swiat*, September 15, picturing two young Yugoslavs. The issue carried seven more pages of pictures and text on Yugoslavia.

More Wage Increases

Unrest among workers, exemplified by the Lodz transport strike last August, has forced the government to raise wages in a number of industries. According to Radio Warsaw on September 30 the increases, to be financed by the recent 15 percent increase in the prices of hard liquor, will be extended to about 600,000 workers this year. By the end of September 459,000 workers had received raises totalling 940 million *zloty*—an average of about 2,000 *zloty* per year (average industrial worker's monthly wage: 1,200 *zloty*). They included 34,000 transport workers, 103,000 postal and communication workers, 80,000 nurses and laboratory workers in the health service, 11,000 in the cement industry, 39,000 in ore mining and 160,000 in metallurgy and other heavy industries. The lowest average increase—about 1,656 *zloty*—went to the transport workers, some of whom had been receiving less than 10,000 *zloty* per year.


Soviet-Polish Writers Clash

Strenuous clashes of opinion continued between Soviet and Polish intellectuals. These had marked the Moscow Youth Festival and the previous tour of the USSR by Polish journalists (see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 47-49). The exchanges have most recently occurred in the press of both countries. Taking their cue from Party chief Khrushchev's summer-long denunciation of "revisionist" literary work, the Soviets have castigated the Poles for straying from the Marxist line generally and for failing to appreciate the literature of the USSR in particular. These denunciations were exemplified by an article in the Moscow periodical, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, which, ironically enough, chose as its victim the new Polish magazine *Opinie*, which happens to be the organ of the Soviet-Polish Friendship Society. The Polish magazine was accused of denigrating Soviet literature; that is to say, it refused to indulge in the uncritical and fulsome adulation of all Soviet "achievements" which Moscow traditionally expects from the Satellites. In contrast to the angry and particularized Soviet charges, the defense made by the Polish weekly, *Polityka* (quoted over Radio Warsaw, October 7), was carried out in polite and general—but nevertheless unbending—terms: "*Opinie* is making a sincere and wise effort to show in full the achievements of Soviet culture," said *Polityka*, but later added the following defiant note:

"We could of course, discuss specific problems. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has already begun discussing them. But we must give *Opinie* its due for breaking with formal, cheap propaganda and revealing the precious picture kept unknown for such a long time."

Slonimski Attacked

Another clash between Polish and Soviet views was exposed in the USSR youth periodical *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on October 3. The journal attacked an interview, given by Antoni Slonimski, the Chairman of the Polish Writers Union, to a Japanese newsman (*Mainichi* [Tokyo],



"I am concerned with realities."

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 10, 1956

September 5):

"It was a short interview. Its translation into Russian covered only half a page of typescript. But in that interview a whole bucketful of dirt was poured on Soviet literature and culture. . . According to Slonimski, Socialist realism harms the development of culture and recently has been used as a weapon against everything that is new. Thus Slonimski states 'one can say that Russian art has practically died.' Slonimski states point blank that Socialist realism is not art."

It is significant that the Slonimski attack came not in Poland, but in Japan. Another quotation from *Komsomolskaya Pravda* article explains this point in the following manner:

"The Polish press, in Slonimski's view, is guilty of something else. Of what? Here we quote: 'We can in our press attack our own government, but we cannot attack

the Soviet government. This is freedom—but only some-time freedom," Mr. Slonimski complains."

Economists Criticized

The Moscow foreign economics monthly, *Mirovaya Ekonomika*, in its July issue, criticized two articles in the Warsaw daily *Zycie Gospodarcze* for attempts to revise "Marxist-Leninist assessment of modern bourgeois political economy." One of the articles, by Polish economist Drewnowski, was chided for stating the apparent assumption that "economic science" needed to be "restored" and for advocating such "capitalist-subjectivist" concepts as "marginal calculations" and "economic equilibrium." The other article, by Zdzislaw Sadowski, according to the Soviet periodical, requested that economic science be separated from ideology, pleaded for the creation of a pure political economy whose elements would be acceptable to all economists, regardless of their political views, and even went so far as to defend some of the views of John Maynard Keynes. The same Soviet article also condemned another Polish economist, Czeslaw Grabowski, for a statement in *Ekonomista* (Warsaw) that "it is necessary to search for the scientific elements in contemporary bourgeois economic theories."

Polish Philosophy Excoriated

A more general and long-range attack on Polish "revisionism" appeared in *Voprosy Filisofii* (Moscow), September 9. Articles in the Polish philosophical journal, *Mysl Filozoficzna*, were characterized as "traditional *petit bourgeois* opportunism." According to *Voprosy Filisofii*, Polish writer E. Szacki had called for unity "in the struggle for the protection of each culture from reaction, including Stalinist reaction." Another Pole, R. Zimand, drew the censure of the Soviet periodical for saying that "Marxism has been destroyed by Stalinism . . . and must be built anew." The Moscow journal also denounced Polish antagonism to the teaching of Marxism in schools as follows:

"How can people pretending to be Marxists and Communists plead against compulsory lectures on basic Marxism in universities and institutes? [How can they] deny the need of Marxist textbooks at a moment when the



"I am seeking that aspect of Polish life which is beyond criticism."
Polityka (Warsaw), September 4-10, 1957

reactionaries are again lifting their heads and striving to guide the education of youth, and when lectures on religion are reintroduced in the schools?"

The Soviet article closed with the following blanket condemnation of the school of Polish philosophers which it disapproves of:

"Is this discussion on topical problems of Marxism necessary? Is it in the interests of the development of the world Communist movement? The criticized authors are perverting Marxism under the banner of the struggle against Stalinism. Will this struggle bring any good results to the proletariat? Is this Marxism? Definitely not."

Gomulka Reports on Visit to Tito

First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka addressed a meeting of the Communist Party organization at the Zeran Automobile Factory in Warsaw on September 21. His speech, printed in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), September 25, dealt with his recent visit to Yugoslavia (see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 1-2, 37-38). He was particularly intransigent on the question of Poland's western boundaries, reiterating that he would retain the Oder-Neisse lands (former German-held territory) even at the price of war. "There are no alternatives here," he said, "and if anybody raises the question of changing our western frontiers, there is only one choice, that of war." He praised Tito's declaration of support for Polish retention of the Oder-Neisse boundary and spoke of enlarged economic ties with Yugoslavia. "We decided to convene a commission of economic cooperation between Poland and Yugoslavia," he stated, "just as we convened a commission of economic cooperation with Czechoslovakia."

As the mention of Czechoslovakia, above, indicates,

Party Press Circulation Down

POLISH COMMUNIST DAILY NEWSPAPERS have dropped 33 percent in circulation since December 1956. Figures published by *Prasa Polska* (Warsaw) in August reveal a decrease of 852,000 copies in the same period. Subscriptions are down 479,000 copies or 51 percent. On the other hand, non-Party dailies have gained 145,000 in circulation during the first five months of 1957. According to the journal, circulation of literary magazines has dropped 150,000 copies and there are similar decreases in circulation of papers published for the countryside. Illustrated magazines, however, have showed a tendency to gain readers in the past half year.

Gomulka was most careful to reassure the Soviet Union—as he had done almost every day during the meeting with Tito—that no “Belgrade-Warsaw Axis” was in the making. “We have no intention of creating some new focal point in the Communist movement,” he stated, “and it must be strongly emphasized that our conversations resulted not only in a strengthening of Polish-Yugoslav relations, but also in the increase of solidarity in all Socialist States.”

Peasant Party Plenum

Since 1949, the compliant United Peasant Party (ZSL) has been tolerated and even encouraged by Communist authorities in order to rally rural support for regime policies. (For a discussion of peasant parties in Poland and elsewhere in the Satellite area, see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 3-13.) Following the events of October 1956, however, there has been increasing evidence of restlessness and independence on the part of the organization's rank-and-file membership.

Despite the Gomulka government's acquiescence in the dissolution of over 80 percent of the collective farms and a wide curtailment of the hated system of compulsory deliveries, little popularity has accrued to the Communist Party. Instead, the peasantry has rallied hopefully to the ZSL, applying so much pressure as to become acutely embarrassing to the leaders which the Communist Party hand-picked for them, as well as a danger to the regime itself. ZSL recruitment campaigns have been all too successful, and the no-longer-docile puppet is currently giving signs of increasing strength.

Under these circumstances, the regime has apparently decided to call a halt, and to demand that the Peasant Party move leftward and backward in the wake of the Communists. The occasion for the crack-down was the Seventh Plenum of the ZSL's Central Committee in Warsaw, September 24-25, and the Peasant Party hierarchy (Stefan Ignar, Chairman; Boleslaw Podeworny, Jozef Ozga-Michalski and Czeslaw Wyczech, Deputy Chairmen) bent all efforts to the familiar tasks of condemning heresies and performing obeisances to the Communist Party. Ignar spoke of the “trouble-makers and enemies of Socialism” in the following manner:

“Under the pretext of combatting dogmatism and bureaucracy, these people would like to weaken our State economically and politically. Such people can be found in the towns, but there are also many of them in the countryside.” (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 25.)

Resolution Attacks “Reaction”

A resolution, not in the least reflecting the view of the rank-and-file and certainly passed under pressure of the Communist Party, was adopted by the Plenum. Excerpts follow:

“Within the last months in rural areas and throughout the country, reactionary forces have appeared which utilized democratic liberties and existing economic difficulties for attacks aimed at weakening the worker-peasant alliance and PZPR [Communist]-ZSL cooperation in particular.

Therefore, the ZSL Central Committee declares the necessity of intensifying the fight against anti-Socialist forces and right-wing forces and the necessity of internal consolidation of the party and of strengthening its cooperation with the PZPR.

“The right-wing forces now active in the rural districts and throughout the country question the leading role of the working class in national life and the PZPR leadership in the worker-peasant alliance. They would like to push the ZSL into the road of opposition, to antagonize peasants and workers, to set the ZSL against the PZPR. . . . At the same time they warm up obsolete agrarian conceptions and very often quite openly, and still more often ambiguously, forecast the advent of a ‘second stage,’ a stage of abandoning Socialism. The retrogressive forces come from landlord and bourgeois groups or are bound with these groups. They also have support from clerical circles. Some groups of the ZSL, contrary to the radical traditions of this party, are yielding to the influence of clericalism.”

Discussing the Peasant Party session, *Dziennik Ludowy* [Warsaw], the ZSL organ, was quoted over Radio Warsaw, September 28, as follows:

“Elements hostile to People's Poland have often tried to break up the worker-peasant alliance and make cooperation between the ZSL and the PZPR difficult by purposely distorting the October achievements and the declaration of principles of cooperation between the PZPR and the ZSL. The harmfulness of this activity is obvious.

“Pressure of the right-wing elements is also expressed in other ways. Their activity can be seen in the economic field. Taking advantage of the rebirth of various forms of cooperatives in the countryside and of peasant self-government, they are trying to use this trend to their own advantage, to restore capitalism by forming, not cooperatives, but ordinary capitalist companies in disguise for all kinds of economic speculation. This must be determinedly opposed.”

Strike Policy Expounded

The rash of strikes for higher wages which has plagued the country since mid-summer was given no encouragement in the September issue of the Party theoretical organ, *Nowe Drogi*. (For accounts of the strikes in Lodz and Silesia, see *East Europe*, September 1957, pages 28-29 and October 1957, page 49.) The review stated:

“People's Poland does not deprive the workers of the right to strike. However, our Party says quite openly and firmly to the working class that a strike is not the way to attain an improvement in the standard of living, that it does not increase but reduces the nation's supply of bread, that it does not help but harms the working class; [it harms] all of us. That is why there should be no strikes. They must be effectively prevented, preferably by political methods.

“The first thing to do in our efforts to prevent strike situations in factories is to wage a determined fight to deal properly and in time with all just grievances. . . . But there are also unjust grievances . . . demands for additional pay raises . . . [which] at the present moment cannot be without harm to the entire working class and the whole national economy.

"The workers have the right to submit their grievances to all State bodies, including the government, both through their permanent representative bodies and their trade unions, as well as through *ad hoc* delegations selected at normal meetings called legally by the factory council. Where these possibilities are not taken advantage of . . . and a strike is proclaimed, it is difficult not to assume the influence of forces which are not concerned with just grievances but with fomenting a political demonstration."

Ambassador Recalled

Soviet Ambassador Pantalejmon Ponomarenko was recalled to Moscow on September 29, in a move which caused little surprise in diplomatic circles. Ponomarenko is reputedly close to the Polish Stalinist groups; his relations with the Gomulka regime were cool. His recall has been expected since his reported advocacy of strong measures against Gomulka and his followers during the latter's assumption of power in October 1956. According to Radio Warsaw, October 2, Ponomarenko's successor will be P. A. Abrasimov, former Minister-Councillor to the Chinese People's Republic.

Torturers Go On Trial

Three functionaries of the Ministry of Public Security in the days before the Gomulka regime went on trial, September 16. According to a Radio Warsaw broadcast of the same day the three men, Roman Romkowski, Jozef Rozanski and Anatol Fejgin are accused of illegally imprisoning a number of persons and ordering or allowing mental and physical torture to be used; Romkowski and Rozanski are additionally charged with personally applying violence when questioning prisoners. The trial, which is being held *in camera*, is expected to last for several weeks.

Trade Union Meeting

The related problems of unemployment and vocational training for young workers were discussed during the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of Trade Unions, September 23-24. On the first day of the conference, debate hinged on the role of trade unions in setting up and supervising vocational training schools for the 100,000 young workers who enter Poland's labor force each year (Radio Warsaw, September 24). The meeting also stressed the desirability of increased contacts with the labor movement outside the "Socialist" countries.

The main speaker of the second day's session, Wlawn Tulodziecki, Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, described the situation as regards opportunities for vocational training as having deteriorated since October 1956 and advocated the establishment by the unions of schools and training centers where young people could study three days a week (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], September 25). Attendance should be compulsory for juvenile workers, he added. Tulodziecki also stated that in many Polish enterprises as much as 60 percent of the work force consisted of workers under the age of 25. A quarter of these have had at least seven years of school-

Workers' Party?

THE OFFICIAL PARTY DAILY of Koszalin, Poland, *Glos Koszalinski*, August 22, stated:

"In the last six months . . . 1,014 people in Koszalin Province were removed from the Party lists and deprived of their Party membership. This is a considerable figure. The largest number of those removed were workers. Among the newly accepted candidates—and their number is rather small—workers (including farm workers) constitute 37.1 percent of the total, while of those removed, 55.6 percent were workers. Among those removed, peasants also constituted a considerable proportion (13 percent). In the Walcz District Party organization, 59 workers and eight peasants were removed, but no worker or peasant candidates were accepted during the same period."

ing, but there are many, he added, who cannot read or write.

Disarmament Proposal

Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki used the UN General Assembly Session of October 2 to propose—with the prior consent of all Warsaw Pact members—an agreement between the two German States and Poland. Under Rapacki's plan all manufacture and stockpiling of atomic and thermonuclear weapons would be banned from both parts of Germany and his own country. Czechoslovakia later volunteered to join the pact.

More Workers' Councils

Figures released by the Central Council of Trade Unions show that workers' councils exist in 4,316 of the 10,447 State enterprises where they may legally be formed (Radio Warsaw, September 28). Of 1,419 strictly industrial enterprises, 1,176 (or 82.9 percent) have workers' councils. In mining and power industries, 86.6 percent have formed councils. Only 29.7 percent of enterprises under the Ministry of Agriculture have workers' councils.

The trade union statistics show that the greatest increase in the formation of workers' councils took place in the fourth quarter of 1956 and the first quarter of 1957. At present the formation of workers' councils is most rapid on State farms and in the Public Service Ministry, which have only recently gained the right to form councils.

Departures Curtailed

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), September 28, explained the recent curtailment of permits for departure from Poland as "temporary in character, resulting solely from the difficulty of the existing currency situation." During the first half of 1957, the journal states, departures abroad of private persons cost the State Treasury "a tremendous sum reaching close to three million dollars."

In an analysis entitled "Why Do They Run Away?" appearing in *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), Sep-

tember 11, the cause of what the article called "emigration hysteria" was attributed to the defectors' belief that their material conditions would improve in the West. According to the journal, "Only a concrete agricultural program will remove the need for mass emigration."

Heavier Punishment for Speculators

Regime spokesmen seized the occasion of a meeting of the National Council of Judges to deliver stern lectures on the necessity for more severe treatment of "speculators." In an address to the group, broadcast over Radio Warsaw, September 27, Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz scored the "excessive forbearance" of the courts toward persons charged with economic crimes. The Premier's speech, characteristically milder than that of Justice Minister Marian Rybicki who followed him, dealt with the "painfulness" of a situation in which "the punishment meted to most of the speculators, thieves and bribers, compared to the value of their unlawful gains, make their activities profitable."

There was a note of warning in Rybicki's speech which may presage a curtailment of the comparative freedom of the judiciary under Gomulka. The Justice Minister implied that the regime was prepared to take other measures if the courts did not react to present criticism. The independence of the judges, he said, "cannot mean the isolation of the courts from the political line of the people's State."

National Councils Strengthened

The National Councils, local administrative bodies, may have been strengthened by a decision of the Council of Ministers, September 10 (Radio Warsaw, September 11). In the future the Councils will be permitted to draft their own detailed economic plans for their areas well before—and not after, as was often true in the past—the fiscal year gets under way. This decision is the first legal instrument to allow the councils to distribute their investment means with a certain amount of local independence from the national government. Another decision of the Council of Ministers, taken the same day, will give supplementary appropriations to the councils to enable them to prepare their budgets before the beginning of next year.

Change in Export Regulations

Private individuals may now export certain items without restriction provided they pay customs duties on them. The new regulation, which went into effect on October 1, applies to 39 items including mushrooms, porcelain, goose feathers and amber. Previously only gift parcels could be sent out of Poland. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) of October 1, the change is designed to prevent the commercial export of goods in the form of duty-free gift parcels—a practice said to be increasingly widespread in Poland. Books and music published since 1945 remain free of duty, but only one copy may be sent out at a time.

Price of Butter Increased

In an effort to induce the Polish consumer to eat less milk fats and more of other fats, the government revised

the price structure on September 29. Butter went up 25-28 percent, cheese 10 percent, sour cream 18 percent and other milk fats by corresponding amounts. At the same time the price of margarine was reduced by 12 percent and the prices of animal fats by 11-22 percent. A kilogram of choice butter will now cost 64 *zloty* in comparison to 25 *zloty* for a kilo of margarine. Minister of Internal Trade Mieczyslaw Lesz told a reporter for Radio Warsaw on September 28 that Poland cannot afford to import enough butter to satisfy the demand under the old price. He added that the Poles consume more butter per capita than do the British, Dutch and Americans.

Renowned Economist Visits London

Oscar Lange, one of the best-known Marxist economists and former Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations addressed the Inter-Parliamentary Union in London, September 13. In words rare for a Communist, he spoke of the British House of Commons as the "guardian of [British] liberties." He also urged coexistence, disarmament, and a ban on nuclear weapons.

Hungary

Writers' Strike Broken

Two recent developments—a letter, denouncing the UN Resolution against Soviet aggression in Hungary, purportedly signed by writers who took part in the Revolt, and the publication of a new literary magazine—suggest that the end has been reached in the year-long "silence strike" of writers against the Kadar regime (see *East Europe*, October 1957, page 42).

Since there is no evidence that anti-Stalinist—and in many cases anti-Communist—literary men and women have suddenly become enamored of Kadar's repression, it may be assumed that the strike was broken by various regime pressures; chief among them, no doubt, the necessity to earn a living. There have also been speculative reports from Western sources that a deal may have been arranged whereby the writers promised to begin production and to offer tacit or moderate support to the authorities in exchange for a



Jozsef Fodor, the first and long the only important Hungarian writer to support the Kadar regime, speaking at the meeting of writers summoned to condemn the UN Report on Hungary.

Orszag Vilag (Budapest), September 10, 1957



Two pictures of the border between Hungary and Austria. Above, the barbed wire erected by the Hungarian regime; right, soldiers in Soviet-style uniform plant mines to prevent escape from Kadar's Hungary.

Both Free Europe Press Photos

promise to spare the lives of imprisoned Revolt authors such as Tibor Dery, Tibor Tardos, Zoltan Zelk and Gyula Hay.

The first indication that the strike was being broken came at a mass meeting held in Budapest to "protest" the above-mentioned UN Resolution. As reported by *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) on September 5, a denunciation of the UN measure was read by poet Joseph Fodor, who has collaborated with Kadar since the Revolt. Signatures of most of the previously silent writers—not in prison—who had taken part in the October uprising were said to be on the document. Prominent among them were Peter Veres, Gyula Illyes, Pal Szabo, Aron Tamasi. In all there were 171 names on the list (Radio Budapest, September 6). Significantly, head of State Istvan Dobi felt called upon to assert that "our writers have signed this statement voluntarily" in a speech reported in *Nepszabadsag*, September 17. Two weeks later a rather dubious note was struck by Radio Budapest in a broadcast on September 30 which stated that "several writers have reported that they had not been informed in time . . . to add their signatures to the protest with which they are in complete agreement." The names of some dozen new writers were then added to the list.

The statement against the UN Resolution was couched

in vituperative Communist style, with the Revolt described as "unauthorized and alien imperialistic interference which brought the scum of Fascist elements to the surface." Emigre writers were dealt with in the following manner:

"The ones who fled must remain quiet, for if they speak out, theirs can be only the voices of renegades. They will become traitors to their nation." (*Nepszabadsag*, September 5.)

This fulsome denunciation of the "counterrevolution" was not, however, so fiercely echoed in a letter which appeared in the first (September) edition of *Kortars* (Budapest), the new literary monthly which will apparently draw most of its contributions from the formerly silent writers. The letter was signed by six prominent literary figures, Laszlo Benjamin, Sandor Erdei, Istvan Orkeny, Lajos Konya, Gyula Sipos and Lajos Tamasi, all of whom sided with the Revolt. Interestingly, however, only Orkeny and Tamasi signed the declaration against the UN Resolution. The letter stated, in part:

"There were people who expected our fight [the Revolt] to have quite a different result, who expected the collapse of Socialism and the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. . . . We knew as well as they that such expectations were completely false. . . .

"Only a healthy Socialist development can be successfully defended against attempts at capitalist restoration. On this basis we considered our chief task to be the correction of mistakes in our Socialist development. However, this development itself and its future possibilities had to be—and will have to be—defended against the onslaught of reaction, even while we are exposing and healing past mistakes and unhealthy growths. In this defense we have been guilty of neglect.

"If well-intentioned people at home and abroad were able to entertain doubts, even temporarily, as to whether we writers desire and defend worker-peasant rule and Socialism in Hungary, this doubt burdens our conscience. . . . Let our whole life and work be devoted to the service of the Socialist development of the Hungarian people. Those who are against Socialism and worker-peasant rule in Hungary, are also against us."

Regime Criticizes Letter

This letter was unsatisfactory to the regime literary magazine, *Elet es Irodalom*, September 27, which voiced its displeasure at its insufficient self-criticism as follows:

"On reading the letter, disappointment takes the place of interest. We cannot help feeling that the writers of the letter have passed over certain events—about which much could be said—as if they had never happened. . . . The writers should face themselves and reality more

courageously. Only then will references to their Communism receive credit."

The first issue of *Kortars* featured an essay by the renowned Hungarian writer, Laszlo Nemeth, who figured prominently in the pre-Revolt ferment and has until now remained silent.

Marosan Threatens Students

Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan delivered a blustering speech to the students of the Technical University of Budapest on September 23 (Radio Budapest, September 23). His words contained not only threats to the student body, which was one of the focal points of the October Revolt, but several admissions of continued unrest. That there was very serious ferment and repression as recently as July 1957 is indicated by the following statement:

"Someone has just been saying to me, 'Give us reassurances. You rounded up 1,200 people here in July . . . what guarantee is there that you will not continue to round up people?' Believe us when we say that we found no pleasure in rounding up 1,200 people, a number of whom have already been set free, mostly engineers and others, but not Horthyite officers. . . ."

Marosan also admitted that the Communist Youth



League, KISZ, "is in a very difficult position at the universities . . . because it is burdened by many legacies." This, apparently, was a reference to the hated youth organization of the past, but in contrast with speeches by Party chief Kadar and head of State Dobi to non-student audiences in August (see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 41-42), there was no direct censure of the pre-Revolt regime.

In his more threatening passages, Marosan said:

"Foreign radio stations and press reports said last June that I had come here at that time and you had booed me. This is untrue. I have never been here before, but I intend to come often in the future to see whether teaching here is proceeding satisfactorily. . . . I should like to tell my young student friends that October 23 [anniversary of the first day of the Revolt] is to be a working day and a school day. I shall come personally to the Technical University to see that it is. . . . Anyone who is not present, and cannot produce a certificate to prove that he was ill, should be reminded that there are 15,000 students who did not manage to get a place in the University, as there was not enough room."

"Juvenile Delinquency" High

Marosan's blustering was caused no doubt by fear and dissatisfaction in the regime hierarchy at the present temper of Hungarian youth. *Esti Hirlap* (Budapest) on September 27 carried a report of the Budapest branch of the Party on the problem of youth, stating that juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, immoral and "disrespectful behavior" were extremely high. There was also too much job changing among young people, the journal averred, and unjustified demands for higher wages as well as walk-outs were frequent. The newspaper also said that, "At the universities, and in other strata of Hungarian youth, bourgeois, anarchistic and nationalistic attitudes still can be found, and demoralizing, bad and unpatriotic influences prevail."

The September 18 issue of the same paper stated that the Communist Youth organization (KISZ) would organize young people between the ages of 14 and 16 for work on canals, dams, railroad projects and forestation enterprises. This may be interpreted as still another effort to end the "insubordination" of youth.

Regime Seeks Mass Support

Still striving to counteract its almost universal unpopularity, the regime has continued its efforts to revive the Patriotic People's Front. On September 2, there was an assembly of the leaders of the organization at which Antal Apro, its titular head, asked—certainly with regime approval—that the PPF be given representation in Parliament and other legislative bodies. On September 7, permission was granted to recommence publication of *Magyar Nemzet*, the organization's newspaper, which supported Imre Nagy during the Revolt and has been banned ever since.

The Front did its usual thorough job during the by-elections held in various parts of the country in September

for posts on rural and municipal Councils. There was, of course, no opposition slate. Front candidates, under the circumstances, had no difficulty winning huge victories. The only remarkable feature of the elections was their lack of publicity. It appeared almost as if the regime wished to get the voting out of the way, while attracting as little public attention as possible. *Nepszabadsag*, October 2, published a government decree which provides for more financial "independence" for these various community Councils. Henceforward they will be permitted to "determine their own budgets on the basis of their sources of income." Since the Councils are completely under regime control, especially after these recent elections, there is little prospect that their new financial "independence" will upset centralized planning and control.

Women's Group Reviewed

The Council of Hungarian Women has also been revived (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], September 15). This group, which was notoriously unpopular during the Rakosi era, simply disappeared last October. Now it hopes to marshal as many women as possible to Kadar's support. Efforts also got underway to recruit support from Protestants, as the Dean of the Calvinist Theological School was "induced" to issue a statement urging that the People's Popular Front become a "forum" for the masses (*Nepszabadsag*, September 27).

The Economic Situation

Hungary's economy, racked by years of forced industrialization and crippled in last year's Revolt, is not yet on a stable footing. As the country approached the first anniversary of the October Revolt, Kadar's lieutenants were satisfied to claim that they had mastered the problem of inflation and that production was approaching the level of mid-1956. Theoretician Istvan Friss, lecturing at the Political Academy in Budapest, told Party members that workers' and peasants' living standards were higher than before the Revolt (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], October 2). He ascribed the improvement to several factors: rectification of the "mistakes" committed in previous years; abolition of the compulsory delivery system in agriculture; and heavy imports of consumer goods financed by Soviet bloc credits. The number of employed workers in August was slightly higher than a year before, and the average monthly wage was 18 percent higher, he said. On the other hand, output

Big Sister

A BUDAPEST LADY, Mrs. Armin Balint, has organized a "social watch service" of 100 women to observe and report to competent authorities the "irregularities" of her fellow townsmen and women, and to keep an eye on the thoroughness with which such conduct is "remedied." The September 24 *Nepakarat* (Budapest), the trade union daily, reports that the service has been operating for several weeks.



At a meeting of Hungarian judges and lawyers in Budapest, one of the series of meetings called by the Kadar regime to "protest" the UN Report on Hungary.

Orszag Vilag (Budapest), September 3, 1957

per worker was 14 percent lower. He declared that although the "overambitious" policy of heavy industrial development pursued during the Rakosi period had been abandoned, Hungary could not continue to consume 95 percent of its national income as at present. The country must, he said, put an end to the waste in its economic life.

Price Controls

To keep the lid down on inflationary pressures, the government established a National Price Office at the beginning of the year. Recently there have been indications that the system of fixed prices was being widely evaded, not only by private individuals but by government ministries. Bela Csikos-Nagy, president of the Price Office, has denounced "disguised price increases" made by substituting lower quality goods for standard quality (*Nepakarat* [Budapest], September 27). He charged that this had occurred in the woolen textiles and the confectionery trade as well as in local industries and among private artisans. The government, he said, was determined to take strict measures against any infringement of price controls, not only by private tradesmen but by ministries as well. Radio Budapest welcomed this assurance in a broadcast of September 27, pointing out that hitherto the government had prosecuted only private tradesmen and had not taken action against what it called the "big boys."

Stocks Declared Ample

At the same time the government issued assurances that the living standard would not be allowed to deteriorate. Minister of Internal Trade Janos Tausz told a press conference on September 26 that supplies of milk, dairy products, flour and bread will be maintained.

"There is a gratifying improvement also in the supply of citrus fruits, as 370 carloads of oranges and 120 of tangerines are expected to arrive. We can also expect deliveries of dates, bananas, figs, raisins and cocoa. Food supplies are guaranteed by the fact that our food stocks at present are 15 percent higher than they were on September

30, 1956. Clothing supplies will also improve, and some shortage may be expected only in good-quality poplins. The supplies of woolen materials and silks will be similar to those of the preceding quarter. Fifty percent more artificial silk and nylon underwear will be made. As a result of the good work of the miners, we possess 11,500 tons more coal than a year ago. This year 560,000 families will obtain organized distribution of fuel supplies. Difficulties may be expected in firewood supplies."

Other press reports, however, indicate a severe shortage of footwear, particularly for children, as well as inadequate supplies of ready-to-wear clothing, winter coats and flannel goods.

The Ministry of Heavy Industry announced on September 30 that the electric power industry had enough coal for 20 days, the railroads for 50 days and light industry for three months.

Private Tradesmen Increasing

Private handicraft and retail trade have grown considerably in the last year, encouraged by government tax concessions and credit. There are now more than 5,900 private retail stores in Budapest (*Nepakarat*, October 3), and the total for the whole country is said to exceed 13,000—about 50 percent more than a year ago (*The New York Times*, September 8). These entrepreneurs have recently been the subject of much official criticism charging them with "corruption and profiteering," evasion of income taxes, and—in the case of private craftsmen—subcontracting work for State enterprises.

In mid-September the Ministry of Internal Trade issued a decree forbidding private tradesmen to engage in wholesale trade or the bulk buying of farm produce, under penalty of criminal prosecution (*Nepszabadsag*, September 18). To obtain more thorough control over private business the regime has organized a Federation of craftsmen and retailers. Bela Gervay, its Secretary-General, announced at the beginning of October that the Federation will establish regulations for each of the trades, beginning with tailors and fuel dealers, and will enforce them by regular inspections.

Reaction to Vatican Decree

The regime responded angrily to the Vatican ultimatum of September 8 to the Hungarian Bench of Bishops, in which Roman Catholic clergymen were forbidden to accept posts in parliament on penalty of excommunication. A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement:

"Publication and implementation of the Vatican edict can be carried out only by approval of the State. To my knowledge the Hungarian State has not given such approval, because the edict does not pertain to the clerical activities of the Roman Catholic churchmen. The edict is of secular and political character and is therefore an obvious interference in the domestic affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic." (*Nepszabadsag*, Sept. 28.)

(Continued on page 50)

Czechoslovakia Overhauls Its Economy

Five Year Plan Is Revised

FOLLOWING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS of repeated warning and exhortation, the regime has finally decided to make large-scale changes in the planning and management of the national economy. Signs of economic strain have been manifest since 1953 notwithstanding the cheerful statistics published in Prague. Last February the Party Central Committee pointed to a number of them: continuing shortages in fuel, power and raw materials; inflated production costs; lagging productivity; delays in carrying out investment projects because of difficulties in the building and machinery industries; and disappointing results in agriculture. In June the Central Committee repeated its warning and called a national conference of industries to examine the situation. In August the Slovak Central Committee warned of the same problems in Slovakia. (See April issue, pp. 45-46, August issue, p. 55 and October issue, p. 55.)

The industrial reorganization now taking place in the Soviet Union, plus that country's revision of its Sixth Five Year Plan, have made it easier for the Czechoslovak regime to make similar motions. It did so in a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee held September 30 to October 2.

Novotny States the Problem

FIRST ON THE AGENDA was a report by First Secretary Antonin Novotny (*Rude Pravo*, October 4). He told the meeting that economic performance so far this year had provided "no indication whatever that the decisions of the February plenary meeting . . . are being consistently applied." While gross industrial production was above plan, there were shortcomings in the general quality of production and bottlenecks in the output of certain industries, particularly fuel and raw materials.

"The fundamental problem of industrial production at present is the lagging production of coal and basic metallurgical raw materials. The growing deficit in hard coal extraction, resulting in a decline of stocks, has an unfavorable effect on coke production and on the accumulation of winter supplies. The depleted stocks of rolled products and secondary steel products hamper the growth of machinery production. Another urgent task is to attain a better ratio between the growth of labor productivity and average wages."

A further difficulty was the failure to economize in the

use of industrial raw materials, which he described as "the foremost task of our industry." He criticized Czechoslovakia's vaunted machinery industry for failing to produce machinery of the required quality and to deliver it on time. However, there were "serious defects" in other industries, including the building industry, transportation and distribution. He also acknowledged poor "wage and labor discipline"—evidenced by the payment of excessive wages, absenteeism and pressure for additional manpower.

Higher Living Standards

Novotny stressed the improvements in living standards made during the last year: price reductions, wage increases, a shorter workweek, higher pensions and improvements in the health insurance system. But he implied that they had exceeded the capacity of the economy to pay.

"As we have stressed on several occasions, increased living standards depend on the economic results achieved by our people in industry and agriculture. Here we must state frankly that the great step forward in the growth of the population's living standards and their further increase must be far better insured than hitherto by the consistent detection and utilization of the immense reserves of our national economy."

Because of all these difficulties, he said, "it was necessary to make certain concrete changes in the [economic] Plan in order to fulfill the tasks set . . . and to insure the best possible satisfaction of the requirements of our society."

Changes in the Plan

THE REPORT ON PROPOSED CHANGES in the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1960) was delivered by Otakar Simunek, Chairman of the State Planning Office. His report was not published, however, apparently because the regime wishes to conceal the precise nature of the changes being made. The Plan was originally made public at the National Conference of the Party in June 1956 (see August 1956 issue) but has remained in draft form ever since and not been enacted into law. Moreover, many details such as the structure of investment outlays have never been published. Thus the people of Czechoslovakia, who are expected to "discuss" the changes, must do so in a carefully defined vacuum.

Judging from the final Resolution of the Central Com-

mittee (*Rude Pravo*, October 4), the regime hopes to raise the efficiency of the economy to such a degree as to achieve more than was originally planned for 1960, and to do this with less investment expenditure. Gross industrial production is to rise 56 percent over the five years rather than the 50 percent originally planned. Capital investment by the State is to be 15 billion *koruny* less than originally planned, while investment "outside the State plan" is to be increased by 11.1 billion *koruny*.

"Industrial production is to be raised by better utilization of productive capacities . . . and, as far as the year 1957 is concerned, by a substantially better utilization of fuels, metals and other raw materials. . . . In order to meet the requirements of the national economy . . . in spite of the reduced volume of investment . . . a maximum of economy must be insured and investment sources must be fully utilized."

Similarly, average wages are to increase by 8.3 percent rather than 6.4 percent. Production costs are to be reduced by only 12.6 percent instead of 14.8 percent. Labor productivity is to rise by 39.1 percent rather than 42 percent. The target for agricultural production is unchanged, but "because of the slower growth of agricultural production [than planned] in 1956, the pace of the development of agricultural production in the remaining years . . . is to be faster."

Industrial development in Slovakia is to be pushed faster, and total production there is to rise by 74 percent instead of 61 percent.

Concentration of Investment

The Resolution did not explain how more production was to be obtained with less investment, lower labor productivity and higher costs than envisioned. One saving factor was that no private individual would have any way of determining in 1960 whether gross industrial production had actually risen by 56 percent. But evidently the planners had decided to shift investment in such a way as to maximize the short-run gains at the price of discontinuing or postponing certain long-range projects. This was implied by the First Secretary when he said: "Capital investment funds in the various branches of industry must be concentrated in such a manner as to accelerate the bringing-into-operation of basic production equipment which is of decisive influence in the proportional development of the national economy."

In addition to shifting investment, the regime had already begun to decrease outlays wherever it could. A large-scale economy drive was under way in the construction field. *Rude Pravo* commented on September 26 that "it will be possible to reduce our building expenditure by more than four billion *koruny*"—i.e., about the amount of the proposed reduction in total planned investment.

Reorganization of Industry

Another attack on the problem of economic efficiency was outlined by the report of Premier Vilam Siroky, who discussed questions of organization, management, planning and financing (*Rude Pravo*, October 5). He revealed that

Czechoslovakia is about to undertake a decentralization program resembling that recently begun in the USSR. The program will be discussed by the Central Committee again in January 1958, and formally launched on April 1, 1958.

Siroky began by stating that decentralization is not new to the Czechoslovak economy. Already, he said, the regional National Committees manage "almost 22 percent of all capital investments, more than 25 percent of total manpower, about 22 percent of wage funds and over 33 percent of the capital funds of the national economy as a whole." But he confessed that the economy still suffers from too much centralized bureaucracy and a lack of initiative and responsibility on the lower levels. One consequence is that "the drawing up of plans is more or less a matter for the government, the State Planning Office, and partly for ministries, and has a decided [publicity?] campaign character which culminates in the approval of control figures and at the end of the year in the approval of the plan." Officials on the lower levels, denied authority, assume the attitude that "their main task is to fight for low plan targets so that they can be sure of fulfilling them and exceeding them without great effort."

He proposed that various functions of management be transferred from the central ministries to local organizations—as is now occurring in the USSR—and that the staff of the ministries be "considerably reduced." Associations of factories and other enterprises will be set up instead, and given responsibility for supply and marketing functions.

"They must be told to supply the national economy with products of a certain variety. This will greatly contribute to the simplification and stabilization of relations between suppliers and customers. It will do away with anonymity in these relations and will create conditions for increased responsibility with regard to quality, technical standards and the meeting of delivery dates."

The enterprises and their associations will also be given facilities for doing their own research and development, in the hope of speeding technological progress.

In concluding, Siroky referred to the reorganization of management going on in the USSR, and said that "we are in principle solving the same problem, although the concrete ways and methods stem from the needs arising out of our own conditions, from our own national economy, and from the experiences gathered in our Socialist construction."

Selling the Program

The decisions of the Central Committee are to be followed up by a two-month campaign among the people. This was to begin with the publication of a letter from the Central Committee to all working people on October 20, explaining the problems and inviting them to "express their opinions." The letter will become a topic of discussion in trade unions, youth organizations and all the other multifarious arms of the Communist regime. In addition, the discussion will be keyed to the preparations for the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party to be held sometime in the first half of 1958.

Czechoslovakia

Persistent Literary Ferment

The smoldering resentment of writers against the necessity to produce the kind of "Socialist realism" acceptable to Communist functionaries has now again come into the open. This ferment, which has taken place throughout the area and even in the USSR, was considered menacing enough to rate a three-speech denunciation by Soviet Party boss Khrushchev himself (see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 38-39). In its most extreme form the anger against official censorship was manifest in the *Poprostru* riots in Warsaw and the "silence strike" in Hungary (see Poland and Hungary, above). Although less close to the surface until now, the resentment of Czechoslovak writers may well run as deeply and—to the regime—as dangerously as in the other Communist States.

One example of the criticism being leveled against the literary *status quo* is an article written by the chief editor of the newly-established periodical *Nova Literatura* for the August 31 issue of *Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava), the organ of the Slovak Writers' Union:

"The themes of our literature are stunningly stereotyped. . . . One must therefore, substantiate that, on principle, no limits can be put on the author's artistic selection of facts, regardless of whether they pertain to nature or society or imagination. . . . The quality of artistic work will not be assured if the final product has already been formed in the postulate. This is the most frequent cause of schematism. . . .

"Fear of anything new and great, fear of hostile ideology, consequences of the cult of the individual, and lack of trust in our own capabilities have created the opinion that Socialist literature is something that has already been accomplished and now has only to be copied."

The literary periodical, *Literarni Noviny*, as have many other non-Stalinist Satellite publications, sought support from the Chinese example. With Mao Tse-tung's "hundred flowers of thought" theory in mind, the journal republished in its September 7 edition an article from *People's China*, entitled, "The Policy of 100 Schools As I See It," which stated:

"If we want to reach the truth, to solve a scientific problem, it is clear that we must allow the scientists to compete freely. This involves a struggle between different observations, even contradictions, from which will emerge a new unity and perception of reality. Science simply cannot progress without such conflicts. This is the basic law of dialectical materialism."

The discontent is not limited to writers alone. According to the August 8 issue of *Vysoka Skola* (Prague), a monthly published for the universities and colleges, "publishing is another headache." The journal continues with the assertion that, "State publishing houses are compelled to reject scientific works and publish popular manuals of inferior value, because scientific works do not sell well, and a publishing house must, after all, show some profit."

The Party officials were, of course, not slow to counter-attack, but their angry retorts were in many cases as re-



Entrance to the Brno Engineering Exhibition in Czechoslovakia (see p. 51).

Slovenka (Bratislava), September 23, 1957

vealing as the original charges. For example, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), on September 8, stated that, "There are people even in our country who complain about a lack of artistic feeling, who say that we attempt to suppress all expressions of a free mind, that we do not allow illustrations of our untrammelled inner selves."

Anti-Church Campaign

The regime continued attacks on Roman Catholic leaders with a "Peace Rally" on September 10, addressed by the excommunicated priest, Josef Plojhar, who is also head of the puppet Czechoslovak People's Party. Plojhar castigated the Vatican order which forbade priests membership in parliament and all participation in political life under the Kadar government in Hungary (see Hungary). He also denounced representatives of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in West Germany for "backing the inciters of new wars" in that country (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], organ of the Czechoslovak People's Party, September 11). The September 7 issue of *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) also editorialized against the Vatican order.

Rude Pravo published three extensive articles, September 17, 18, 19, which purported to "reveal" the ties between the Vatican and the Salesian "spy ring," the mem-

bers of which were sentenced in August (for details, see *East Europe*, August 1957, pages 55-56, October 1956, page 55).

Engineering Exhibition

The third Engineering Exhibition took place in Brno from August 31 to September 29. Closing ceremonies, reported in *Rude Pravo*, September 30, featured a visit by Premier Viliam Siroky who commented afterwards to reporters that the chief engineering developments in the future would lie in the field of automation and mechanization of production processes. The newspaper stated that over 1,600,000 visitors attended the exhibition and that almost twice as much business was done by exhibiting Czechoslovak firms as at last year's exhibition. No exact figures on export sales were given, but it was averred that business was heaviest in tractors, machine tools, products of the automobile industry and agricultural machinery.

Collectivization Campaign

Since midsummer the regime has renewed its drive to collectivize as many farms as possible, with the aim of achieving an "overwhelming preponderance" for the Socialized sector in agriculture by 1959. Radio Prague claimed on October 2 that during September another 95,000 farmers had been brought in, adding 375,000 hec-

Mining in Czechoslovakia

LET US LOOK AROUND the Sokolov district; let us see in what sort of an environment the miners live, the ones who work in the pits called "George," "February 25th," "Unity," "Silvester," "Friendship," "Medard," and others.

"In the towns and suburbs there is a severe shortage of housing. A typical relic from the past is the house of a miner in Jehlicna. This man has been working underground for 37 years, has seven surviving children (of the ten his wife has borne), the youngest of whom is still in the crib. The family lives in the former cowshed of a stone farm house.

"A Sokolov miner has few scenic beauties to enjoy. Does a stream flow under burdock leaves? That is only water pumped from the mines. . . .


"Bread is sometimes brought in three days old. Often the people have to wait until evening for delivery. Vegetables are scarce in the shops and in the plant dining rooms. Fruit? Ask the schoolchildren how frequently they have seen fruit.

"As for culture, there is no theater and even the cinema is insufficient. The Miners' House is ill-designed and unattractive, useless for the needs of the region.

"The hospital? Oh, my God! The patients sometimes lie in the corridors.

"This is the Sokolov district."

Lead article by Marie Majerova,
Literarni Noviny (Prague), September 7



Elements of a sugar refinery being constructed in India by Czechoslovakia.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), August 10, 1957

tares to the collectivized area. The total number of collective farms was said to be nearly 11,000 as compared to 8,016 at the beginning of the year. The "Socialist sector" of agriculture—including collective farms, State farms and other publicly owned land—is now said to embrace about 60 percent of the agricultural land.

Dissatisfaction with Youth League

The failure of the Communist Youth League to attract and interest the nation's young people has recently led to suggestions that the organization abandon much, if not all, of its political indoctrination work and model itself on the regime-disbanded Boy Scout organization. *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), on September 17 attacked these suggestions and denounced articles in *Zlaty Maj*, *Literarni Noviny* and *Turistika*, where they had appeared. Similarly, the Youth League's Central Committee in plenary session in Prague rejected the Boy Scout plan (*Mlada Fronta*, September 22) and denounced those at the session who had brought it up.

Particularly outrageous to the journal was the conduct of "a young teacher in the Sereď district" who founded a youth group "without the label of the Czechoslovak Youth League." Fortunately, from *Mlada Fronta's* point of view,

"league functionaries were able to convince her of the incorrectness of her action."

Expelled for Approving Hungarian Revolt

Sympathy for the Hungarian rebels still runs strongly through the country, as was emphasized by an item in the September 17 issue of the Party magazine, *Zivot Strany* (Prague). According to the account, Antonin Nezhyba of Moravia has been expelled from the Communist Party for openly backing the "counterrevolution," and for "asking a provocative question at a recent Party meeting."

Bulgaria

Fight Against Former Party Leaders

An editorial on Party unity in the August issue of *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), theoretical organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party, served, despite its intent, to emphasize the disunity in the ruling hierarchy. Repeatedly asserting the correctness of the April 1956 Central Committee Plenum decisions—which demoted the Stalinist former Party boss and Premier, Vulko Chervenkov—the journal castigated both the "viciousness" and "brutal administration" of the personality cult era. On the other hand, there was a strong attack against the "misuse" of self-criticism to disseminate anti-Party views. The editorial charged former Politburo member Georgi Chankov and former Central Committee members Dobri Terpeshev and (less harshly) Yonko Panov—all demoted in July 1957—with attempting to thwart measures designed to increase the standard of living and with working primarily for the aggrandizement of their own power. The charges against Chankov, in particular, are noteworthy in that they resemble the recent accusations by Soviet Party boss Khrushchev against Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich. The *Novo Vreme* article marked the first public specification of the misdeeds of the purged Bulgarian officials.

Another development, reported by Reuters, September 19 (though not mentioned in the Bulgarian press), found former Finance Minister Ivan Stefanov and former Politburo member Nikola Pavlov—both sentenced to life imprisonment during the Kostov purge in 1949 and rehabilitated in 1956—making a visit to Moscow and being granted an interview with Khrushchev. The two men are said to have complained to the Soviet Party chief that they have been refused governmental positions, in spite of their public rehabilitation.

The post-imprisonment history of Stefanov and Pavlov, along with the *Novo Vreme* castigation of Chankov (who is not known as a Stalinist and who spent most of the war years not in the Soviet Union, but in Bulgarian jails) for his failure to perform the rite of self-criticism, seem to show a continuing fear in Party officialdom of the "revisionist" heresy. Conversely, the unabating fulminations against Chervenkov and the personality cult make it appear that the regime is unwilling to regress all the way back to Stalinism. An uncertain "middle course" apparently still holds sway.

Suggested Resumption of Ties with US

The official Communist organ, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, reiterated on September 24 Party boss Todor Zhivkov's plea (first voiced in an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent, September 21) for a renewal of diplomatic relations with the United States. The newspaper disclaimed regime responsibility for the severance of relations in 1950, then continued as follows:

"Facts prove that there are no obstacles for the normalization of relations between Bulgaria and the United States, if there is good will on both sides. Such good will on our part exists, and if so far no results have been achieved, we are not to blame."

Relations between the two countries were broken when the United States Minister was expelled from Bulgaria in

Jazz out of Hand

TO THE CHANTS of "Rock 'n Roll—Rock 'n Roll," from the audience at the Sofia Summer Theater on August 26, the touring Czechoslovak jazz band of Karel Vlach responded with a vigorous rendition of "Rock Around the Clock." The onlookers stood up and applauded, swaying rhythmically, stamping their feet in unison. An elderly peasant woman was observed joining in the hand claps, her eyes tight-shut, smiling happily. Another woman hoisted a gaily-colored parasol and began opening and closing it in time with the music.

When the piece was finished, there was a deafening roar of applause, and Vlach began an encore. Immediately the audience was on its feet, the rhythmic stamping commenced, the lady with the parasol went back into action. Then a militia officer sighted her and started forward, intent on making an arrest. There was a moment of silence from the crowd, followed by a burst of boos and derisive whistles. The officer was pushed and jostled by youths in the audience. His cap was knocked to the ground, and after a few minutes he himself followed the cap, felled by a blow from an angry youngster. The crowd at once opened an escape lane for the boy, but closed it as soon as the officer, having regained his feet, attempted pursuit. All the while the booing and whistling continued. Finally the orchestra withdrew, and the audience gradually dispersed, muttering angrily.

The regime authorities immediately informed Vlach that Rock 'n Roll was *verboden* at the remaining performances for which his musicians were booked. Vlach furiously retorted that he, and not the Bulgarian Communist officials, would draw up his program. He refused point-blank to deprive Sofia audiences of the Rock 'n Roll they demanded. Rather than yield to the regime's demands, he cancelled the remainder of his Bulgarian tour and went back to Prague.

Bourgeois Distortions

RADIO BUDAPEST, OCTOBER 3, quoted the following passage from *Nepszabadsag*, the official Party daily:

"At present we are faced with three very dangerous bourgeois views, nationalism hand-in-hand with anti-Semitism, the bourgeois distortion of democracy and Socialist demagoguery. These three views, expressed as: 'Let us be free,' 'All Hungarians are brothers,' and 'Higher wages,' have become high-sounding and widespread slogans."

February 1950 for "connivance" with the purged Traicho Kostov group. The late Kostov has since been rehabilitated, but no retraction of the original accusations against Mr. D. Heath, the US Minister, has so far been offered.

Yugoslav Border Passage Eased

Regular bus service between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia has been inaugurated, and automobile traffic will be allowed at the newly opened crossing point between Kula and Zajecar (Radio Sofia, October 3). These developments lead to the first means of public conveyance between the two countries—save for railroad transport via the Orient Express—since the Cominform break with Tito in 1948.

Romania

Disunity in the Regime?

What might well be a continuing struggle for power within the hierarchy was dramatized on September 24, when the Secretariat of the Trade Union Council denounced its own newspaper, *Munca*, in the pages of that journal. One of the members of the Secretariat is Liuba Chisinevski, the wife of Iosif Chisinevski who was demoted from the Politburo in July 1957, but apparently still remains in the Party's Central Committee (see *East Europe*,

Truly Free Literature

"TRULY FREE LITERATURE is Socialist literature, because its creators do not hide themselves behind transparent 'non-political and neutral' cloaks, but openly express their attachment to the working class, to the Socialist idea. The cloaks of concealment are necessary to those who want to hide their nakedness of ideas as well as their humiliating role as servants of one exploiters' class or another."

From an editorial in *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), September 12, 1957.

"On Soviet Soil"



Note: "A few days ago there arrived in Krasnovodsk [USSR] the first group of Bulgarian youth, who will work on the Uzbekistan State Farm." Caption (spoken by the boy with DSNM on his back—the initials of the Bulgarian Communist youth organization): "Comrade Crop, the Bulgarian youth brigade is ready for the harvest campaign!"

Za Kooperativno Zemelede (Sofia), July 6, 1957

August 1957, pages 44-45). It may be speculated that this couple and the faction to which they belong have used the attack on *Munca* as a diversion—or a show of strength—against the reigning forces of Party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. The charges against the journal were centered about its "grave error" in failing to report fully on the Fifth Agricultural Forestry Workers' Trade Union Conference. *Munca* incidentally had also failed to mention a speech by Mrs. Chisinevski.

Another somewhat unusual piece of criticism appeared in the September 21 issue of *Scinteia* (Bucharest), the Party organ, when novelists Francisc Pacurariu, G. Ignatescu and Mihail Serban were taken to task for producing works described as colorless, stereotyped, sugary and unconvincing. Criticism of these typical features of "Socialist realism" contrasts rather strangely with attacks on "revisionist" literature which have recently occupied the national press (see *East Europe*, October 1957, page 56).

Albania

Education in Albania

Tirana State University was formally opened on September 16. This is Albania's first university, and the occa-

"An American Killed My Mother"

The following atrocity story, almost a caricature of the worst kind of Stalinist "big lie" journalism, appeared in the August 15 issue of the Bulgarian Youth Journal Narodna Mladezh. Purported to have been written by one Pak Mun Yan, a student at the Pyongyang Educational Institute, it was dedicated to the 12th anniversary of the North Korean regime.

I WAS BORN in the village of Sadonri, in the county of Ultin, in Kisenmen region, Kanvon Province. I studied at a primary school and later a gymnasium [high school]. To enable me to study, my mother worked as a washer-woman or as a cook.

"The unforgettable day—August 15, 1945—saw me a young man, shortly after my graduation from the gymnasium. But South Korea was occupied by the American troops. I can't help remembering these days. In the streets of Seoul, American military jeeps were driving madly. 'Only the victims are held responsible for death under the wheels of the cars, because they have hindered the execution of the military duties of the occupation troops'; this was stated in one of the numerous orders of the occupying troops, who, taking advantage of it, bestially crushed and killed innocent Koreans. What numbers of children died under the wheels of these beasts with human faces!

"I saw with my own eyes how a long-legged American soldier seated in a jeep was throwing chocolate; he wanted to photograph the children gathering this delicacy. But to his surprise, the children not only did not take the chocolate, but started throwing it back. Then, this soldier of the US army pulled out his pistol and shot at the children.

"Once, in the course of an early summer morning, on a path in Namsan Park I saw the bloody dead body of a woman. It turned out later that this woman had been raped and afterwards bestially killed by several American

soldiers. I could no longer stand the unprecedented crimes of the American military personnel and decided to return to my native village, to my mother. We carried on our farming. This did not last long. I received an order to report right away at the recruiting office and enlist with 'the Army of National Defense.'

"My mother advised me to escape. 'Under Japanese domination,' she said, 'the young people looked for life in the mountain, avoiding forced enlistment in the damned army of the divine Teno.' I took her advice and escaped.

"The police had searched the whole village and had threatened my mother: 'Tell us, where is your son?' But my mother kept silent. The damned traitors in their uncontrollable malice ruined our old small house and took with them the poor woman. When I returned home early the next morning, the neighbors told me everything, and a few days later I learned that my mother had been shot.

"To this very day the American cannibals continue committing terrible crimes in South Korea.

"Now I study in the Pyongyang Educational Institute. I am one of those who at the time of the war enlisted with the glorious People's Army and together with all our people fought the damned enemy and won a glorious victory.

"I add my angry voice to the common cry of the disgusted Korean people: 'American imperialists, leave Korea!'"

sion was marked by a speech, broadcast over Radio Tirana the same day, by candidate Politburo member and First Deputy Premier, Manush Myftiu, who described educational conditions in the country as follows:

"Before the war 75 percent of the population was illiterate. At that time only 58,000 pupils attended the few existing primary and secondary schools. . . . Now illiteracy among people under the age of 40 has been liquidated. The school system contains 3,200 primary, seven-year,* secondary, general, technical and higher

*The seven-year schools, which exist in some sections of Albania, contain the regular five-year primary course with two extra years added.

schools, attended by 242,000 pupils. . . . Primary education is compulsory and the seven-year schools are progressing in that direction. . . . At present, over 5,000 students, or about four times more than the number of pupils who were attending secondary schools before the war, are now enrolled in higher schools. The number of textbooks that were published in 1957 alone exceeds that published during the whole period of the rule of Ahmet [King] Zog's clique. . . . The University should meet the great demands created by the tasks of the second Five-Year-Plan, as well as the significant prospects opened to the country by the great aid provided by the Soviet Union."

Texts and Documents

PROPOSAL FOR BALKAN ENTENTE

The following combination of text and explanation concerning the Romanian proposal for a Balkan Entente was released in Scinteia (Bucharest), September 17. The release contains the more important specific contentions made to individual recipients of the proposal as well as the exact text that was addressed to all of them.

AS WAS ANNOUNCED by the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic on September 10, Chivu Stoica, Chairman of the Romanian People's Republic Council of Ministers, sent messages to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Albanian People's Republic, Mehmet Shehu, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Anton Yugov, the Premier of Greece, Konstandinos Karamanlis, the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz-Tito, and the Premier of Turkey, Adnan Menderes.

"I address you," the Chairman of the Ministerial Council of the Romanian People's Republic writes in his message [to all the heads of State], "on the problem of improving and developing relations among the Balkan countries, of consolidating friendship among the peoples of these countries and their peaceful coexistence. The Romanian Government is glad to note that at present Romanian relations with the Balkan countries are developing in a positive way, and we are striving to make these relations even more lasting and fruitful."

The message further deals with the relations between the Romanian People's Republic and each of the countries in the Balkans.

Cooperation with Albania

"Fruitful and lasting relations of cooperation and Socialist assistance were established and are being strengthened and permanently developed between the Romanian People's Republic and the Albanian People's Republic," reads the message addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Albanian People's Republic. Economic and cultural exchanges are being intensified, as are the mutual visits of men of science and culture and representatives of public

organizations. The two States are closely united by their efforts in promoting peace and international cooperation.

Links to Bulgaria

The text sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria says that the traditional friendship between the Romanian and Bulgarian peoples has found a new and powerful brightness in the Socialist cooperation which unites the two countries by indestructible and friendly links. The political, economic and cultural relations between the Romanian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which are continually being strengthened, have led to economic and cultural progress in both countries and form a reliable support in their fight for peace and friendship among all peoples.

Cooperation with Greece

"I am convinced," states the text sent to Premier Karamanlis of Greece, "that you share my satisfaction at the way in which relations between Romania and Greece have been unfolding lately. Supported by the mutual sympathy between our peoples, linked by old traditions of cooperation and many common interests, Romanian-Greek relations are developing and consolidating quickly. In the economic field more and more subjects are coming to the fore in which the requirements of the economy of our countries can be satisfied in a mutually advantageous way. The ambassadors of art and culture of each are warmly received on the territory of the other. There is no doubt that any action aimed at widening and strengthening cooperative relations between our countries will receive the approval and powerful support of both our peoples."

Friendship with Yugoslavia

"An important factor for the Romanian people and government is the steady progress of friendly relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," states the text sent to the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. "Along with the old traditions of friendship, Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation is strengthening and developing today on the unflinching basis of the community of our Socialist aims. The Bucharest and Brioni joint declarations of the Romanian and Yugoslav governments have established a broad and concrete program of activity for deepening and steadily widening the fruitful relations between the Romanian People's Republic and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The two governments perseveringly adhere to this program in the interests of both our peoples and of general peace."

Message to Turkey

Concerning direct relations between Turkey and Romania, the text sent to the Premier of Turkey reads:

"I consider that in the interests of our peoples we can insure, by mutual good will, wide development in the political, economic and cultural domains on the basis of respect and mutual advantage. The treaty of friendship, non-aggression, arbitration and conciliation, concluded in Ankara in 1933 between Romania and Turkey, proclaims that, 'there is and will continue to be inviolable peace and sincere friendship' between our countries and peoples. For nearly a quarter of a century, since the signing of this treaty, neither of the parties has seen the necessity for resorting to its clauses of conciliation and arbitration. This is proof that between our countries there are no differences which could hinder the development of good relations. I am convinced that any action aimed at widening and strengthening the relations between our countries will be warmly received, both by the Romanian and Turkish people."

Text to All Countries

Further, the message sent to the heads of government of the Balkan countries contains the following:

"The Romanian government expresses at the same time its firm conviction that the establishment of relations of many-sided, peaceful cooperation among all

countries in the Balkan region corresponds to the fundamental interests of the people in this region for the insurance of peace, security and economic and cultural progress, as well the interests of peace throughout the world.

"The peoples of these countries, who are profoundly interested in the maintenance and consolidation of peace, have felt for a long time the necessity for such relations. I am convinced that they will warmly welcome the efforts made for their development. Throughout the ages, links of friendship between the Balkan peoples have been maintained, and the awareness of their common interests and aspirations has pointed the way to ever more united and closer cooperation. At the present stage of economic and cultural development in the Balkan countries, the possibilities for strengthening and extending relationships have, in our opinion, an excellent chance for realization.

"We must not, of course, overlook the fact that among some States in the Balkans there are some unsolved problems and some disputes. But this fact, in the opinion of the Romanian government, must not hinder inter-Balkan cooperation.

"We are convinced that this cooperation would create a favorable atmosphere for good neighborly relations and peaceful cooperation among all the Balkan States and would also encourage the development of multi-lateral economic relations. This corresponds in the highest measure to the economic interests of the Balkan States, their industrial and agricultural development, and the raising of their people's living standards. Moreover, it would encourage greater commercial exchange as well as the mutually advantageous development and use of air, water and rail transport.

"Cultural ties between our countries, mutual visits of men of art, of professors, students and tourists, and exchange of technical-scientific experience, can be greatly extended. In this way the achievement of our peoples in the spheres of literature, art, historical research and other branches of science can be put to better use. All these things will lead to a greater rapprochement and knowledge between our peoples and countries, to the growth of mutual understanding, esteem and friendship.

"Starting from these principles, the Romanian government has concluded that the fundamental interests of the Balkan peoples have proved the necessity of establishing large-scale collective cooperation among the countries of the Balkan region.

"Bearing in mind the multiple means and possibilities of cooperation between our countries, the Romanian government considers it necessary that this important problem be examined jointly, without delay, and at the highest level by representatives of the interested governments.

"For this purpose I propose a conference in 1957 of the heads of government of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania in one of the capitals of the participating countries to be agreed upon. We would be glad to offer this conference the hospitality of the capital of Romania.

"In the opinion of the Romanian government, the conference could examine and make decisions on problems relating to the strengthening of peace in the Balkans; non-aggression; the solution of any outstanding questions by peaceful means; the development of economic and cultural relations and of personal contacts between the leaders of the countries in southeast Europe; the exchange of delegations; mutual visits; expansion of contacts between representatives of public opinion, and so forth.

"The Balkan States could agree at this conference to abstain from any acts of aggression, thus guaranteeing the security of their borders and establishing mutual confidence. So that this cooperation among the Balkan States may be of lasting character, the Romanian government proposes the achievement of a collective understanding among the Balkan States which will insure peace in this region and the prosperity and progress of the Balkan peoples. The Balkan understanding must be based on full equality of rights of the participating States, mutual respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs.

"The proposed measures fully conform to the UN Charter, which aims at the maintenance of peace and international security, the development of friendly relations among peoples, and the achievement of international cooperation through the solution of international problems by economic, social, cultural and humanitarian measures. The proposals contribute to the fulfillment of these high principles.

"I would also like to emphasize that the understanding between the Balkan countries is not meant to become a grouping in opposition to other States outside it [the conference], nor a hindrance on the road of developing friendship with States which are not a part of the regional understanding in the Balkan area.

"The achievement in the Balkan region of fruitful cooperation among States with different social systems might significantly contribute to the organization of similar cooperation on an all-European plane, and to the creation of a general European security system.

"I have no doubt that you will agree with me that, in the present condition of international relations, the main task of all countries, big and small, is to contribute, individually and jointly, to the creation of an atmosphere of understanding, confidence and cooperation among all States. Our people, just as peoples all over the world, desire peace and an end to the tensions in international relations, so as to permit an easing of the armament burden which weighs so heavily on their shoulders. Our people also desire the wider utilization of their material resources for the development of their national economy and the raising of their well-being.

"There is no doubt that the achievement of an understanding among the Balkan States, based, as shown above, on equal rights, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, will make an important contribution to the maintenance and consolidation of peace in the world and to the relaxation of tensions in international relations. I express my conviction that the results of the conference will prove the usefulness and contribute to the development of meetings and mutual visits among the leaders and statesmen of the Balkan countries. [The conference] will lead to the establishment of mutual understanding and to the widening of cooperation and friendship among the peoples of these countries.

"The Romanian government expresses its hope that the governments of the Balkan States will carefully examine its proposals and will participate in such a conference."

In conclusion Chivu Stoica emphasizes that the Romanian government attributes great importance to the contribution which each of the governments of the countries addressed can make to the cause of cooperation and friendship among the peoples in the Balkans. The Romanian government awaits with interest their observations and proposals in connection with the organization of the conference and with the problems which ought to be discussed. There is no doubt that the Romanian government will pay particular attention to the opinions and proposals made by each of these governments on this vital problem.

Recent and Related

Titoism, by Charles P. McVicker (*St. Martin's Press*: \$6.00). The primary purpose of this book is to present an analysis of the development of the political and social system of Yugoslavia since 1948, when Tito broke with Stalin and Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Dr. McVicker explains the development of Titoist ideology in relation to the Yugoslav "road to Socialism," and considers in detail the internal policy reforms that the Yugoslav Marxists have carried out since the break with the Cominform. To retain power, the Titoists have been obliged to broaden representation of the people in the foundations of government, and in theory they have recognized the rights of the individual. In practice, however, they remain a minority government and must exercise Party control to stay in power. The author believes that the future development of Communist political systems will follow the path first explored by Tito, and, as opportunity arises, will pursue a course of "liberalization." Index.

Leninism, by Alfred G. Meyer (*Harvard Univ.*: \$5.50). Based on the belief that the development of Leninist ideas has played a deciding role in determining the conduct of the Communist Party, Mr. Meyer has presented an analysis and an explanation of Leninism, rather than a discussion of Leninist philosophy, in an attempt to relate Leninism to its formative influences. He examines the Leninist ideas which have played a role in the crucial political decisions and long-range plans of the Soviet Communist movement. Leninism is seen as an application of revolutionary Marxism to the conditions of Tsarist Russia in the early part of the 20th century. Marxist ideas are confronted with Leninism at every step, and both are compared with Menshevism, revisionism, and other Marxist schools. Mr. Meyer believes that an understanding of Leninism is essential to an understanding of Communist policies because the Communist image of the outside world and approach to the solution of problems is couched in the imagery of Lenin's ideas. Bibliography, notes, index.

The Big Thaw, by C. L. Sulzberger (*Harpers*: \$4.00). Drawing from years of journalistic experience as a foreign correspondent, Mr. Sulzberger has written a book going behind the scenes and into the presence of the Communist leaders of today. He compares the words and deeds of Soviet leaders, analyzes their

fears and motives, and provides the reader with greater understanding of the Soviet empire and where it has been heading since the death of Stalin. The book offers insight into the mixture of contradictions and consistencies that is the Soviet empire today. The author points to the greater freedom inherent in the recent attacks on Stalin and "the cult of the individual" as a crucial opening in the Communist wall, one with great opportunities for development, particularly in the Satellite countries. Index.

The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832, by David Marshall Lang (*Columbia Univ. Press*: \$5.50). This book is concerned chiefly with the history of Georgia on the eve of the Russian annexation in 1801, and with the years immediately following the Russian occupation. The last years of the Georgian monarchy include the period of the last two final dynasties. The story of the first three decades of Russian rule describes the earlier effect of tsarist domination on Georgia and gives an account of the final attempt to restore the royalists to power in 1832. Mr. Lang states that it is impossible to understand the nationality problem of the Soviet Union unless it is realized that many of the constituent Republics of the USSR were, until relatively recent times, independent States, with their own national traditions. The Soviet Union's present drive for power in the Near East, the author feels, can be better understood by looking at the history of the once-independent nations of Caucasia. Bibliography, index.

Russia Against the Kremlin, by Alexandre Metaxas (*World Publishing Co.*: \$3.00). Mr. Metaxas, an internationally known journalist, lived in the USSR the better part of a year before writing this book. Aided by his knowledge of Russian, he was able to mingle and talk freely with ordinary people without creating the usual barriers. Much of the book is drawn from conversations with the man in the street. What the average Soviet citizen thinks of the present Soviet government, to what extent he supports the Kremlin policies at home and abroad, and how he feels about the major problem of the Western world, are some of the questions explored by the author. Although Mr. Metaxas has for the most part recorded the sentiments and opinions expressed to him by the people themselves, he advances some personal opinions based on his observations.

Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, by Alexander G. Park (*Columbia Univ. Press*: \$6.75). This study presents a detailed analysis of the aims, methods and achievements of Soviet policy in Central Asia during the first decade after the 1917 revolution, and provides the first detailed picture of the impact of Communist rule on the lives of the millions of Moslems living east of the Caspian Sea. The author is largely concerned with tracing the working relationship between the living institutions of Soviet rule and the political, economic and social goals set up by the Soviet rulers. The meaning of the Soviet theory of nationalities is tested by the extent to which established Communist doctrinal propositions influenced the conduct of revolutionary activities in the tsarist colony of Turkestan. This, the author states, establishes a point of departure for an investigation of the political, economic and cultural policies which the Soviet government adopted in its announced effort to foster national equality in the borderlands. He deals with the question of whether the Soviet regime, despite its development of novel forms of political and social organization, succeeded only in establishing a colonial system of its own. Bibliography, index.

The Russian Struggle For Power: 1914-1917, by C. Jay Smith, Jr. (*Philosophical Library*: \$4.75). A study of the Russian war aims pursued between 1914 and 1917, this book suggests that the key to Soviet imperialism in the 1940's lies in the historic aspirations of the Russian State prior to 1917. The author believes that when Soviet leaders realized they were masters of the historic Russian State and not of a Communist world, they reverted to the pattern of earlier Russian rulers. He also deals with the secret treaties Russia made with the Allies during World War I. The book is based upon documents published by the Soviet government. Notes, bibliography, index.

The Red Book of the Persecuted Church, by Albert Galter (*Newman Press*: \$5.75). Drawing on Communist sources as much as possible, and supplemented by reliable eye-witnesses, this book summarizes the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church by various Communist governments. The author traces the strategy and tactics of Communist persecution from 1939 to the present. Bibliography, indices.

EAST EUROPE
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed



Printed in U.S.A.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
313 NO FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICH
ATTN STEVENS RICE
5168 7-57

Sec. 34.66, P.L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

